Three Essays on the Metaphysics of Objects and Properties

Bob Brandom

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Chapter One

Understanding the Object/Property Structure in Terms of Negation: An Introduction to Hegelian Metaphysics in the *Perception* Chapter

I

The task Hegel sets himself in the *Consciousness* chapters of the *Phenomenology* is to make explicit what is implicit in the concept of empirical knowledge. In the terms I introduced in discussing his *Introduction*, this requires saying what is required to satisfy the Genuine Knowledge condition: offering a broadly semantic account of the nature of empirically contentful thought that leaves open at least the possibility that when things go well, how things are for consciousness is how they are in themselves, things appear as they really are. The *Sense Certainty* chapter begins with a simple model. Its starting-point is the recognition that at the core of the idea of empirical knowledge lies a distinctive structure of epistemic authority exercised by episodes of sensory awareness that a knowing consciousness finds itself with, as something that happen to it rather than something done, episodes that in particular are not products of acts of inference. The contents of these empirically authoritative immediate episodes are of the sort that would be expressed linguistically by the use of demonstratives or indexicals ('this', 'that', 'here', 'now'). They have what Sellars calls "token-credibility", contrasting this species with the sort of credibility that accrues to repeatable types (such as Quine's "There have been black dogs,") rather than unrepeatable tokenings elicited observationally.

The way of understanding empirical consciousness that Hegel calls "sense certainty" (a form of self-consciousness—a way a consciousness can understand itself) seeks to secure the intelligibility of genuine knowledge by identifying these episodes of sensory awareness as

themselves already amounting to knowledge, in a way taken to be independent of their relations to anything else. On this conception, error becomes possible when, but only when, the knowing consciousness actively does something with or to the passively acquired episodes of sensory awareness: compares or classifies them, or draws conclusions from them. The strategy of sense certainty is to discern an autonomous foundational layer of sensory knowledge that is incorrigible because it restricts itself to what is given in sensation. The thought is that where consciousness does not act, it cannot err. Hegel seeks to show that this notion of sensory givenness cannot survive the unpacking of its implicit presuppositions. (Exactly 150 years later, Sellars would take up this same task in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.")

The main result of the arguments Hegel rehearses in *Sense Certainty* is that the token-credibility of unrepeatable episodes of immediate sensory awareness is not intelligible as free-standing and autonomous. This distinctive sort of epistemic authoritativeness is real and important, but it is intelligible as yielding a kind of knowledge only when it is understood as situated in a framework that includes two kinds of repeatability of the contents in which it is invested. Diachronically, it must be possible to for the subject "hold onto" what has been experienced when not still experiencing it. One must be able to recollect and thereby secure what is known in acts of consciousness that are responsible to the original, authoritative sensory knowing. These dependent episodes are what the token-credible experiencing is authoritative over. What would be expressed linguistically by demonstratives can amount to knowledge only as part of a larger structure that includes what would be expressed linguistically by tokenings anaphorically dependent on the token-credible demonstrative episodes. Though as immediate in origin they are not themselves the *conclusions* of inferences, episodes of sensory awareness would be epistemically idle if they were not in principle available to serve as *premises* for inferences. An unrepeatable deictic tokening 'that' (for instance in "That is rain,") can count as expressing knowledge only if it can be picked up anaphorically and used to draw a conclusion (for instance "It is wet,"). Deixis presupposes anaphora.

The other sort of repeatability found to be implicit in the concept of the empirical epistemic authority of episodes of immediate sensory awareness, as part of the context within which alone it is intelligible, by contrast, is taken up as the central topic explored in the very next

chapter, *Perception*. This is repeatability as universality.[1] To be understood as determinately contentful, even synchronically, experiences must be conceived as unrepeatable instances of repeatable kinds. More specifically, the *Perception* chapter investigates what is implicit in the idea of *sense* universals, as articulating the contents of what would be expressed linguistically by observation reports codifying perceptual judgments. The progression within the *Consciousness* chapters of the *Phenomenology* is from consideration of the presuppositions of the epistemic authority distinctive of sensory *immediacy*, to the presuppositions of the epistemic authority distinctive of *universality* (in the sense of sense universals, those that are noninferentially applicable), and finally to the presuppositions of the epistemic authority distinctive of pure *mediation* characteristic of theoretical concepts (those one can be authorized to apply only as the conclusions of inferences).

The point of departure of the *Perception* chapter is this lesson we are to have learned by the end of *Sense Certainty*: sensuous immediacy, to be understood as determinately contentful, must be understood as involving an element of repeatability as universality. This conclusion emerges from the observation that playing a cognitive role as even potentially constituting a kind of knowledge entails that the deliverances of sense can be understood as *immediate* or noninferential in only one of the two senses that are run together by empirical consciousness understanding itself according to the structure of sense certainty. They can exhibit immediacy of *origin*, but not immediacy of *content*. That is, the cognitive deliverances of sense *can* be understood as exhibiting a distinctive kind of epistemic authority invested in unrepeatable mental events or acts in virtue of their etiology. This authority derives from their being exercises of responsive sensory consciousness, rather than of inferential capacities. The process from which they result (by which they are elicited) is not an inferential process. In that sense they are 'immediate': the process that issues in episodes of sensory awareness is not mediated by middle terms of the sort characteristic of a *Schluss*, an inferential move, construed syllogistically. However, the claim is, to be intelligible as cognitively contentful, the deliverances of noninferential sensings that are immediate in this procedural sense must in another sense be *mediated* immediacies. Specifically, they must consist in the application of sense universals:

[1] "It is merely the character of positive universality which is at first observed and developed." [114].

concepts that have observational uses in which their application is noninferentially elicited by the exercise of perceptual capacities.

II

Understanding the basis for this claim depends on exploring a complex constellation of intricately interrelated philosophical (Hegel is happy to say "logical") metaconcepts: mediation, universality, determinateness, and negation. The principal result of the investigation of the presuppositions under which purely sensory awareness could count as a kind of knowledge in the *Sense Certainty* chapter is that this constellation of concepts, articulating a notion of conceptual contentfulness, must be applicable to any sort of sentience that is intelligible as a kind of sapience. The *Perception* chapter argues that this requirement has surprising *structural* consequences. Where construing acts sensory awareness according to the categories of sense certainty was compatible with understanding the contents of that awareness as what would be expressed in what Strawson calls a "feature-placing" vocabulary—"It is day," "It is raining,"—fuller consideration of those contents shows that sensings must present the richer structure of "objects with many properties," which would be expressed linguistically in a vocabulary distinguishing and relating singular terms and predicates. That argument proceeds by teasing out the implications of Hegel's nonpsychological conception of conceptual contentfulness, which is articulated by the aforementioned metaconcepts: determinateness, negation (or difference), mediation, and universality.

As I see the argumentative relations among these concepts that are in play early in the *Perception* chapter, our entry is provided by the concept of determinateness. When we investigate what determinateness requires, we find that it implicitly involves a complex notion of negation. In terms of that notion of negation, it then turns out to be possible to explain and show the applicability of both the concept of mediation and the concept of universality. So the picture is something like this:



The linchpin of this structure is clearly the concept of negation. What is it, and how does it emerge from the consideration of determinateness?

The master idea here is the Spinozist scholastic principle "Omnis determinatio est negatio"; all determination is negation. The idea is that being determinate requires some limitation, contrast, or exclusion. The image is of something that has a limit or boundary, so that there is a contrast between it and what is *not* it. That is how negation comes into view. The picture here is then:

A Determinate Thing:



What is "Not It" is everything else, things that are outside of or different from It. Understanding the metaphor of limits or boundaries is a matter of understanding the sense of "not", "else", "outside", or "different" that the metaphor appeals to. The observable contents expressible in a feature-placing vocabulary that were introduced in *Sense Certainty* offer a couple of alternatives. The day of "It is day," and the raining of "It is raining," are different. So are the day of "It is day," and the night of "It is night." But they are different in different senses of "different." In the language Hegel uses in *Perception*, day and raining are *merely* or *compatibly* [gleichgültig] different, while day and night are *exclusively* [ausschlieβend] different. For, though different, day and raining are *compatible* features (it can be both day and raining), while day and night are *incompatible* (it cannot be both day and night).

As I understand him, one of Hegel's most basic thoughts is that determinateness must be understood in terms of exclusive difference. Mere difference is not enough. The contrast between It and Not It required for something to be determinate (for a feature to have definite boundaries) requires that nothing *can* be both It and *not* It. This modally robust exclusion is built into the geometric representational apparatus of Venn diagrams with literal boundaries, as in the picture above. For a point *can*not be both inside and outside a closed plane figure. In this same modal sense, sets—for instance, those representing the extensions of properties—have exclusive 'boundaries'. For it is *impossible* for something to be both an element of a set and *not* an element of that set. The 'not' of Not It is an *exclusive* not. That is the point of the *law* of noncontradiction. It is not just that some regions or sets contingently do not both contain and not contain any points. That is a *necessary* feature of regions and sets. The negation that is defined model-theoretically as part of an extensional semantics for properties itself expresses a modally robust kind of exclusive difference, not mere difference. The modal force is just hidden in the metavocabulary that is the medium of expression of the semantics (whether set-theoretic or geometric).

The connection between determinateness and modally robust exclusion—the ruling out of some alternatives—is codified in the technical concept of information. A signal is informative, contains or expresses information, just insofar as it rules out some alternatives. The measure of information, by which amounts of information are determined, compares the alternative situations or responses that are possible *before* receipt of the signal to those that remain *after* the signal has ruled out some of them as no longer possible (according to the signal). While information can distinguish merely different alternatives, it does so by *ruling out* some of them, excluding them as no longer possible. This same idea is expressed in possible worlds semantics when a determinate proposition is identified with a *set* of possible worlds, a *partition* of all the possible worlds into those *compatible* with the proposition, and those *incompatible* with it or ruled out by it.

The thought with which *Perception* begins, I am claiming, is that the determinateness of the content even of an immediately given sensory knowing, an act of sensory awareness, as conceived according to the metaconception Hegel calls "sense certainty", must be understood in terms of what it excludes or rules out, what is exclusively different from it, not just what is

merely or indifferently different from it. The metadifference between two kinds of difference shows up already in the contents of acts of sensory awareness that would be expressed in a feature-placing vocabulary. The determinateness of those contents cannot be made intelligible solely in terms of their mere difference. Exclusive difference must also be appealed to. If the contents of minimal sensory knowings stood to one another only in relations of compatible difference, none excluding or ruling out any other, then their occurrence would have no significance, would convey no information. They would be mere events, 'that's without 'such'es, gears unconnected to any mechanism, their occurrence as devoid of cognitive significance as any other unrepeatable events. Their differences are less (determinate) than "merely numerical" differences. For numbers are exclusively different from one another. Their differences are less (determinate) than those of featureless Euclidean points, even apart from consideration of all the lines, circles, triangles, and so on whose relations to those points might relate them to one another. For again, being one point precludes being another, whereas merely compatibly different contents can be instantiated together.

In fact contents that are merely or compatibly different are elements of different families of exclusively or incompatibly different contents. Shapes such as circular, triangular, and rectangular are exclusively different from one another. Exhibiting one rules out exhibiting any other (so long as we restrict ourselves to shapes exhibiting the same number of dimensions as the space they inhabit, since a three-dimensional pyramid with a rectangular base might be thought to exhibit both triangular and rectangular shapes). Colors also form a family of exclusively different contents (so long as we restrict ourselves to monochromatic regions). What can be compatibly different is pairs of contents drawn from different families of incompatibles: red and square, green and triangular, and so on. These merely or compatibly different contents are *determinate* only insofar as they *also* stand in relations of *incompatibility* or *exclusion* from contents drawn from the *same* family. It is as such that their occurrence conveys information, by *excluding* the occurrence of other members of the *same* family or incompatibles. Mere difference is intelligible in the context of such a structure exhibiting also exclusive differences. But by itself it is too weak to underwrite any notion of determinate content.

There are, then, fundamental conceptual reasons to understand the notion of <u>determinate difference</u> as implicitly involving the metadistinction between two kinds of difference: exclusive

difference and compatible difference. I think Hegel also thinks that this metadifference is *observable*, that it is part of the phenomenology (in a more contemporary, vaguely Husserlian sense) of sense experience. That is, I think he thinks the compatibility of day with raining, and its incompatibility with night is part of what we are given when we have a sensory experience of the sort that might be expressed in a feature-placing language by "It is day." In grasping that content, part of what we grasp is its place in a space of compatibilities and incompatibilities with other experienceable contents.

On this account, Hegel thinks that more is given in sense experience than empiricists such as Locke and Hume do. The experiences we label 'red' and 'green', and those we label 'rectangular' and 'triangular' are experienced *as* incompatible, as ruling each other out (as simultaneously located), while those labeled 'red' and 'triangular' and 'green' and 'rectangular' are experienced as different, but compatible. The different possibilities of combination, and so the arraying of features into compatible families of incompatibles is a ground-level structure of sensory awareness for Hegel, but not for traditional empiricists. They are obliged to treat the fact that one has never experienced a wholly red and wholly green triangle as on a par with the contingent fact that one has never experienced, say, a wholly blue pentagon. Hegel sees the modal difference between the difference between red and triangular and the difference between red and green as something one knows simply by experiencing them.

Is this difference of opinion about what is given in sensory experience an empirical disagreement? Can it in principle be settled by introspection? Has traditional empiricism suffered from restricting itself to too narrow a conception of the basic knowledge delivered by sense experience? Hegel's analysis of what is implicit in the idea that basic sensory knowledge has a content that is *determinate* provides an argument for the claim that knowledge of which experiential features are exclusively different from which, and which merely different, *must* be part of what one knows in having experiences with those features. (This is not to say that a subject need be incorrigible on such matters.)

One important way in which the enriched empiricism Hegel is considering differs from traditional empiricism (including its twentieth-century variants) lies in its rejection of the latter's *atomism* about the contents of immediate sensory experience. If their exclusive differences from one another are an essential part of what is given in experience, then each has the content it does

only as a member of and in virtue of the role it plays in a constellation of interrelated contents. An experienced red triangle must locate the experiencing of it in the mere (compatible) difference of members of two different families of incompatibles: colors and shapes. (It is interesting to note in this connection that the intrinsic incompatibilities of color properties were a principal consideration leading Wittgenstein away from the logical atomism of the Tractarian idea of elementary states of affairs as independent of one another.) The result is a kind of holism about what is immediately given in sensory experience. The atomism characteristic of the conception of sensory consciousness understood according to the categories of sense certainty is seen to be incompatible with understanding such consciousness as *determinately* contentful.

Equally important, and equally radical, is the fact that Hegel's principal metaphysical primitive, determinate negation, is intrinsically and essentially a *modal* notion. The material incompatibility of red with green and circular with triangular is a matter of what *can* and *cannot* be combined, what is and is not *possible*. Modality is built into the metaphysical bedrock of his system. Possibility is conceptually more basic than actuality, in the sense that an immediately given actual experience is intelligible as having the determinate content it does only insofar as it is situated in a space of possibilities structured by relations of compatible and incompatible difference. The empiricism Hegel is considering is a specifically *modally* enriched empiricism. And we shall see that, by contrast to Kant, for Hegel the essentially modal articulation of what is determinate is not restricted to subjective thoughts or experiencings. It also characterizes objective determinate states of affairs, whether possible objects of sensory experience or not.

III

If the contents that can be given in sensory experience, some of which actually are, (contents that might be expressed linguistically in a feature-placing vocabulary) are determinate in the sense of standing to one another in relations of determinate negation in the sense of modally exclusive difference or material incompatibility, then they also stand to one another in relations of material inferential consequence. In Hegel's idiom, this is to say that although they may be given immediately, the contents of sensory experience are themselves "thoroughly

mediated." For some feature A (such as "It is raining,") has another feature B (such as "It is precipitating,") as a material inferential consequence just in case everything materially incompatible with B (such as "It is fine,") is also materially incompatible with A. In this sense scarlet entails red and square entails rectangular.

In much the same way, even if the features in virtue of which sensory experiences are determinately contentful were construed as unrepeatable, their relations of exclusive difference from one another would ensure that they also fall under repeatables, i.e. that they exhibit a kind of universality. For many colors are alike in that they are exclusively different from red, and all shapes are alike in that they are not exclusively different, but merely compatibly different from red. These repeatable commonalities ramify into arbitrary Boolean complexity. For instance, two otherwise dissimilar features might share not being exclusively different from A or B, but being exclusively different from both C and D. More natural sense universals are construct able using entailments defined by exclusions. Thus all the features that entail red—for instance, shades of red such as scarlet and crimson—can be grouped together, or features entailed by rectangular. As Wilfrid Sellars observes, the primitives appealed to by classical empiricists are determinate sense repeatables. They were concerned with how merely determinable sense repeatables might be understood in terms of these, not with how unrepeatables might give rise to determinate repeatables.

It is in virtue of these facts that I take determinate negation to be a more metaphysically fundamental concept than mediation and universality, as pictured in the first figure in Section II above. The concept of negation that plays the axial role in the metaphysics Hegel introduces in *Perception* is a rich and complex one. As I have indicated, it is introduced as one element of a dyad. This is the metadifference between two kinds of difference: mere or compatible difference and exclusive or incompatible difference. We have seen that these two kinds of difference articulate determinate repeatable features into compatible families of incompatible features, as in the paradigm of colors and shapes. The next step in understanding exclusive difference is to consider it in relation to another kind of negation. Determinate negation also contrasts with formal or abstract negation. The latter is *logical* negation, in a non-Hegelian sense of "logical." Two features stand in the relation of determinate negation if they are *materially* incompatible. I am helping myself here to Sellars's terminology, itself not wholly uninfluenced by Hegel. The

idea is that items determinately negate one another in virtue of their nonlogical *content*. Such items stand in the relation of formal or abstract negation if they are logically incompatible: incompatible in virtue of their abstract logical form.

This distinction is as old as logic. It is the distinction between Aristotelian *contraries* and Aristotelian *contradictories*. Red and green, circular and triangular, are contraries, while red and not-red, and circular and not-circular are contradictories. Both of these are kinds of *exclusive* difference. So this is a further metadifference, between two species of exclusive difference. The first metadifference, between compatible and incompatible differences, is a structure of co-ordination. Neither sort of difference is definable in terms of the other; both are required for determinateness. Together they yield compatible families of incompatible feature-kinds. By contrast, contrariety and contradictoriness are interdefinable There are accordingly two orders of explanation one might pursue in relating them, depending on which one takes as primitive. One can define contraries in terms of contradictories, so determinate negation in terms of formal negation: for *Q* to be a contrary of *P* is for *Q* to imply *P*'s contradictory, *not-P*. Green is a contrary of red and triangular of circular just insofar as green implies not-red and triangular implies not-circular. Or, one can define contradictories in terms of contraries, so formal negation in terms of determinate negation: for something to be the contradictory of *P*, *not-P*, is just for it to be the minimal contrary of *P*, in the sense of being implied by every contrary *Q* of *P*. Not-red is implied by *all* of red's contraries: green, blue, yellow, and so on, and not-circular is implied by *all* of circular's contraries: triangular, square, pentagonal, and so on.



Hegel takes determinate negation to be prior in the order of explanation to formal or abstract negation. He accordingly has the second picture in mind, understanding contradictories in terms of contraries. The traditional of extensional logic and semantics, extending from Boole through Russell to Tarski and Quine, adopts the other order of explanation, understanding material incompatibility as contrariety in terms of formal incompatibility as contradictoriness or inconsistency. Each approach has its characteristic advantages. It is worth noting at this point that the interdefinability of contraries and contradictories (hence of determinate and abstract formal negation) depends on the availability of a notion of implication or consequence. The Hegelian order of explanation has a native candidate. For, as already pointed out, material incompatibility underwrites a notion of entailment: *Q* is a consequence of *P* just in case everything materially incompatible with *Q* is materially incompatible with *P*. What I'll call the Tarskian extensionalist tradition also has available a notion of implication. But it is not directly definable in terms of formal logical negation. It only becomes available if one widens the focus of the Tarskian explanatory strategy. Doing so will illuminate the metaphysical project Hegel pursues in *Perception*. In particular, it makes manifest the difference between building modality in at the metaphysical ground-floor, as Hegel does, and adding it as a late-coming, perhaps optional (Quine) afterthought, as the extensionalist tradition does.

The widening of focus I have in mind is to the structure of singular terms and predicates presenting objects and properties that Hegel argues is implicit already in the idea of determinate features presented by a feature-placing vocabulary. I am going to call a conception of the objective world as consisting of particular objects that exhibit repeatable properties (universals) as having an "aristotelian" structure. I do so because I take it that it is such a commonsense conception, suggested by the way our languages work, that Aristotle aims to explain using his proprietary metaphysical apparatus of individual substances and their essences. I am after the Aristotelian *explanandum* rather than the *explanans*. I take it that it is also the common explanatory target of the *Perception* chapter and of the extensionalist semantic tradition that culminates in Tarskian model theory. (Russell pitched the shift from traditional logics of properties to modern logics of relations as transformative, and along one important dimension, it was. But that difference is not of the first significance for the contrast I am concerned to draw here.) Unlike Aristotle himself, neither Hegel in this chapter, nor the extensionalist tradition in general, makes anything of the distinction between sortal predicates expressing kinds such as

'fox' (which come with criteria of identity and individuation), and mere characterizing predicates expressing properties such as 'red' (which do not individuate),—which is part of what Aristotle's essentialism is a theory of.

There are two broad explanatory strategies available to explicate the aristotelian structure of objects-and-properties. Hegel wants to explain it in terms of determinate negation, relating property-like features. I want to illuminate that metaphysical approach by contrasting it with the extensionalist Tarskian tradition, which starts with objects understood as *merely* different. The two orders of explanation exploiting the relations between contraries and contradictories, hence determinate and formal, abstract negation) are embedded in more encompassing converse explanatory strategies for articulating the aristotelian object/property categorial structure, rooted in the metadifference between incompatible and compatible differences.

The notion of compatible difference that applies to the objects with which metaphysical extensionalism begins does not appeal to modal notions of possibility or necessity. The mere difference that characterizes elements of the domain of objects of the Tarskian scheme is a primitive *material* relation, in that it—like the contrariety with which Hegel's converse explanatory strategy begins—is not defined in terms of formal logical concepts. Properties are represented in Tarskian structures as sets of objects: the extensions of the properties. The indiscernibility of identicals—that is, that if objects *a* and *b* are identical, they have the same properties—will follow set-theoretically from this definition. The other direction of Leibniz's Law, the identity of indiscernibles, will not, unless one insists that *every* different set of objects constitutes a property.

On this basis, contradictoriness, and so formal negation, can be introduced. Contradictory properties are definable as properties with complementary extensions within the domain of objects. *Not-P*, the contradictory of *P*, is the property whose extension consists of all and only the objects in the domain that are not in the extension of *P*. The relation of contrariety is not really represented in such extensional structures. What are intuitively contraries, such as **square** and **circular**, will have disjoint extensions. But not every pair of disjoint extensions corresponds to proper contraries. If the domain does not happen to include a mountain made of gold, **being made of gold** and **being a mountain** will be disjoint properties, without being contraries. The

failure of Tarskian structures to represent contrariety is the result of the modal character of that notion. Contradictoriness of properties *is* represented, because negation is given the same reading in all models: contradictory properties are those pairs whose extensions exhaustively and exclusively partition the domain of objects. In order to represent contrariety of properties, we could in this object-based framework impose a non-logical, material constraint on the Tarskian interpretation function, to ensure that the extensions of contrary properties *P* and *Q* are disjoint in *every* model.

That, in effect, is what the possible worlds development of Tarskian model theory does. The modal element is added by treating contrariety of properties the way logical negation is treated: as a constraint on *all* interpretations. The account moves up to *intensions* of properties by looking at *functions* from *indices* to extensions. The indices can be models, that is, relational structures. Or they can be possible worlds. We have come to see that the differences between these are great. One important one is that models have *domains* of objects. Possible worlds do not. Another is that some *logically* possible worlds (i.e. combinatorially possible constellations of objects and properties) don't count as really (metaphysically, or physically) possible. Whereas any relational structure with the right adicities can be a model. This is the point where modality gets incorporated—that is, at the end, and it then trickles down, via the intensions of properties, to the properties. But it should be emphasized that this constraint is, from the point of view of the underlying raw materials, *arbitrary* and *extraneous*. One simply *stipulates* that the disjointness of domains of certain predicates square and circular, *is de jure*, while that of others, gold, and mountain, is not. Such stipulations come in at the very end of the process of semantic construction, not at the beginning. So possible worlds semantics in the end *also* takes the distinction between incompatible and compatible difference (exclusive and mere difference) for granted. It just builds it in at a different level, as something latecoming.

A particularly extreme version of the extensionalist order of explanation is that of the *Tractatus*. Not only does it not build modality into its modal primitives, it offers only the most attenuated version of it, constructed at the very end as something to be understood in terms of logical contradictoriness and (so) formal negation. The Tractarian scheme starts with mere difference of objects, and mere difference of relations among them. Properties are understood as just relations to different objects. All elementary objects can stand in all relations to all other

objects. At the ground level, there are no combinatory restrictions at all, except those that follow from the adicity of the relations. What is syntactically-combinatorially categorically possible ("logically possible") is possible *tout court*. Elementary objects put *no* constraints on the Sachverhalte they can enter into, so no restrictions on the properties they can simultaneously exhibit. At this level, properties do not stand to one another in relations of exclusive difference—e.g. where being A's mother meaning one cannot be B's father. More complex facts can be incompatible, but this is intelligible only where one truth-functionally includes the logical negation of an elementary fact included in the other. As I mentioned above, dissatisfaction with this treatment of contrariety of colors seems to have played an important role in moving Wittgenstein away from the Tractarian way of thinking about things.

IV

Grafting on at the end substantive constraints on admissible models in the way of possible worlds semantics does not alter the basic Tarskian extensionalist order of explanation. The order of explanation Hegel pursues in *Perception* is the converse of it. It is of the essence of extensional approaches to appeal only to mere or compatible difference of objects. Besides compatible differences of features, Hegel also acknowledges incompatible or exclusive differences. We have seen that these come in two Aristotelian species: formal contradictories and material contraries. Hegel focuses on the material (nonlogical) incompatibility of such contraries. On the basis of this nonlogical modal primitive, he then elaborates the full aristotelian structure of objects-with-properties (particulars characterized by universals).

The process by which the metaphysical structure of objects-with-properties is found to be implicit already in what would be expressed by a purely feature-placing vocabulary, once the features deployed in that vocabulary are understood to stand to one another in relations both of compatible and of incompatible difference involves three distinct moves. Each one involves adding to the picture a further kind of difference, so a further articulation of the complex notion of <u>determinate negation</u>. The first move puts in place the intercategorial difference between properties and objects, or universals and particulars. The second move puts in place an

intracategorial difference between two roles that particular objects must play with respect to properties, reflecting the intracategorial difference between merely different and exclusively different properties. The third move registers a fundamental intercategorial metaphysical difference between objects and properties with respect to mere and exclusive differences.

The first move in this argument finds the aristotelian structure of objects-and-properties, or particulars-and-universals to be implicit already in the observation that the features articulating the contents of sense experience stand to one another in relations of material incompatibility or exclusive difference. This argument can be thought of as beginning with the role that what in *Sense Certainty* Hegel calls "the Now" plays in the distinction between the two basic kinds of difference, compatible and incompatible. What would be expressed by "Now$_1$ is night," is *not* incompatible with what would be expressed by "Now$_2$ is day." It *is* incompatible with "Now$_1$ is day." The incompatibility applies only to the *same* 'Now'. We could say that the 'Now' is playing the role of a *unit of account* for incompatibilities.

What this role is becomes clearer when we think of it in connection with the second dimension of repeatability that emerged from the consideration of the form of self-consciousness that is sensory consciousness understanding itself as sense certainty, namely *recollective* repeatability. For what would be expressed by "Now$_1$ is night," is also incompatible with what would be expressed by "Then$_1$ was day," if 'then$_1$' expresses a recollection, a holding on to, of what is expressed by 'now$_1$'. The unit of account for incompatibilities is the "holding onto" that is expressed by the whole anaphoric chain of recollections of the initial demonstrative 'now'.

Further, 'here' expresses a similar unit of account for incompatibilities. What would be expressed by "Here$_1$ is a tree," is not incompatible with what would be expressed by "Here$_2$ is a house." But it is incompatible with what is expressed by "Here$_1$ is a house." And it is incompatible with what would be expressed by "There$_1$ is a house," if what would be expressed by 'there$_1$' stands to what would be expressed by 'here$_1$' as a recollection that would be expressed by 'then$_1$' stands to what would be expressed by 'now$_1$', that is, as an anaphoric repeatable "holding onto" the spatial demonstrative 'here$_1$'. Indeed, the temporal and spatial indexicals can be combined into the spatiotemporal indexical "here-and-now." What such indexicals express are still units of account for incompatibilities. So are the anaphoric

repeatables formed from them, what would be expressed by '$there_i$-and-$then_j$'s that are holdings-onto what would be expressed by any '$here_i$-and-now_j'. And what holds for these indexical experiencings holds also for demonstrative ones. That what would be expressed by "$This_1$ is triangular," does not exclude what would be expressed by "$This_2$ is circular." But it does exclude what would be expressed by "$That_1$ is circular," if the '$that_1$' functions as an anaphoric dependent recollecting the original tokening '$this_1$'.

In all these case we can see that the same anaphorically extended structure relating unrepeatable indexical or demonstrative experiencings plays the role of a unit of account excluding possession of materially incompatible sensible features. At this point we can see that the notion of incompatible difference, determinate negation, or material incompatibility (which I have been claiming are three ways of talking about the same thing) among *features* implicitly involves a contrast with a different kind of thing, something that is *not* in the same sense a feature, that is an essential part of the same structure. For incompatibilities among features require units of account. What is impossible is not that two incompatible features should be exhibited at all. After all, sometimes it is raining, and sometimes it is fine. What is impossible is that they should be exhibited by the same unit of account—what we get our first grip on as what would be expressed by a tokening of 'now', or 'here-and-now', or 'this', and the repeatability structures they initiate.

So from the fact that what would be expressed by different 'now's can exhibit incompatible features that the structure of sense contents that includes features that can differ either incompatibly or compatibly also essentially includes items that are not features, but that play a different role. These units of account are of a different ontological category from the features for which they are units of account. Besides the *intra*categorial difference (concerning relations of features) between two kinds of difference (incompatible and compatible) of features in sensory experience that would be expressed by sentences in a feature-placing language, sensory experience also implicitly involves the *inter*categorial difference between features and units of account for incompatibilities of features.

That is to say that that what I have called the 'aristotelian' structure of objects-and-properties, or particulars-and-universals, is now seen to have been all along implicit in sense experience, even as originally conceived according to the categories of sense certainty. Making

this implicit structure explicit yields the form of sensory self-consciousness Hegel calls "perception."

One of Kant's innovations is his introduction of Newtonian spatio-temporal identification and individuation of empirical objects, as a replacement of the traditional Aristotelian identification and individuation of individual substances through their essences and accidents. In the transition from the discussion of sensory consciousness understanding itself as sense certainty (immediate demonstrative awareness of sensible features) to sensory consciousness understanding itself as perception (sensory awareness of empirical objects with observable properties), Hegel is forging a conceptual link between Kantian-Newtonian spatiotemporal identification and individuation and the aristotelian structure of objects-and-properties (particulars-and-universals).

A decisive line has been crossed. The content-repeatables exhibited by unrepeatable sense experiencings are no longer to be construed as *features*, but as *properties*. What enforces the transition is the association of those sense repeatables not with what is expressed by the indiscriminate "it" of "It is raining," or the undifferentiated merely existential "there is" of "There is red," but with different, competing units of account. Looking over the shoulder of the phenomenal self-consciousness that is developing from the categories of sense certainty to those of perception, we see that this differentiation of what exhibits the sense repeatables was implicit already in the different 'now's acknowledged by sense certainty from the beginning. No longer are the contents of basic sensory knowings construed as what would be expressed in feature-placing vocabularies. Now they are articulated as what requires expression in vocabularies exhibiting the further structure of subjects and predicates. What is experienced is now understood not just as features, but as objects with properties, particulars exhibiting universals.

V

Understanding functional units of accounts for incompatible sense repeatables more specifically as *objects* or *particulars* involves further unfolding of what is implicit in distinguishing compatible or merely different sense repeatables from incompatible or exclusively

different ones. Hegel says of the features that "these determinatenesses…are really only properties by virtue of the addition of a determination yet to come," namely thinghood.[2] He elaborates that notion of thinghood along two dimensions: the thing as *exclusive* and the thing as *inclusive*. In talking about these two different roles essential to being a "*thing* of many properties", he describes it as on the one hand "a 'one', an excluding unity," and on the other hand as an " 'also', an indifferent unity." The unity of the units of account essentially involves this distinction and the relation between being a 'one' and being an 'also'.[3] These correspond to the roles played by objects with respect to *incompatible* properties, which they exclude, and their role with respect to *compatible* properties, which they include. So the intracategorial metadifference between two kinds of difference between what now show up as *properties* is reflected by the intracategorial difference between two complementary roles *objects* play with respect to those properties, as repelling incompatible properties and as a medium unifying a set of compatible properties.

As to the first, he says:

> [I]f the many determinate properties were strictly indifferent [gleichgültig] to one another, if they were simply and solely self-related, they would not be determinate; for they are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves from one another [sie sich unterscheiden], and relate themselves to others as to their opposites [als entgegengesetzte].

This is the by now familiar point that determinateness requires exclusive, incompatible difference, not just mere or indifferent, compatible difference.

> Yet; as thus opposed [Entgegengesetzung] to one another they cannot be together in the simple unity of their medium, which is just as essential to them as negation; the differentiation [Unterscheidung] of the properties, insofar as it is...exclusive [ausschließende], each property negating the others, thus falls outside of this simple medium.

The 'medium' here is thinghood, the objects that exhibit the properties:

[2] [113].
[3] [114].

> The One is the *moment of negation*… it excludes another; and it is that by which 'thinghood' is determined as a Thing.[4]

If A and B are *different* things, then one *can* be circular and the other triangular, one red and one green. But one and the same thing *cannot* have those incompatible properties. A's being circular and red *excludes* its being triangular or green. Objects are individuated by such exclusions.

On the other hand,

> This abstract universal medium, which can be called simply thinghood…is nothing else than what Here and Now have proved themselves to be, viz. a *simple togetherness* of a plurality; but the many are, *in their determinateness*, simple universals themselves. This salt is a simple Here, and at the same time manifold: it is white and *also* tart, *also* cubical…. All these many properties are in a single simple 'Here', in which, therefore, they interpenetrate…And at the same time, without being separated by different Heres, they do not affect each other in this interpenetration. The whiteness does not affect the cubical shape…each…leaves the others alone, and is connected with them only by the indifferent Also. This Also is thus the pure universal itself, or the medium, the 'thinghood', which holds them together in this way.[5]

The thing as the medium in which *compatible* properties can coexist is the thing as 'also'. It is the thing of many (compatible) properties, rather than the thing as excluding incompatible ones. The tokenings of 'here' that sensory consciousness understanding itself as sense certainty already saw as expressing a feature of its experiencings already plays this role, as well as the exclusionary one. Already in that primitive case we can see

> the medium in which these determinations permeate each other in that universality as a simple unity but without making contact with each other, for it is precisely through participation in this universality that each is on its own, indifferent to the others—As it has turned out, this abstract universal medium,

[4] All of this long passage is from [114].
[5] [113].

> which can be called thinghood itself…is none other than the here and now, namely, as a simple ensemble of the many.[6]

Along this dimension, too, thinghood, the idea of objects as an essential structural element of the structure that contains properties, shows up first in indexical form of here-and-now's, and is generalized first by the idea of anaphoric chains "recollecting" what is expressed by such unrepeatable indexical and demonstrative tokenings, on its way to the full-blown logical conception of particulars exhibiting universals.

The idea of sense experiencings that are determinately contentful in the sense of being not only distinguishable but standing in relations of material incompatibility turned out implicitly to involve a structural-categorial contrast between repeatable sense universals and something else. The something else is "thinghood" or particularity. The notion of particularity then turns out itself to involve a contrast:

> This simple medium is not merely an "also," an indifferent unity; it is also a "one," an excluding unity.[7]

These different but complementary roles reflect, within this ontological category, the distinction between compatible and incompatible differences, within the ontological category of properties.

[6] [113].

[7] [114]. Also: "I now further perceive the property as determinate, as contrasted with an other, and as excluding it…I must in fact break up the continuity into pieces and posit the objective essence as an excluding "one." In the broken-up 'one,' I find many such properties, which do not affect each other but which are instead indifferent to each other." [117]



We have seen that determinateness demands that the identity and individuation of properties acknowledge not only compatible differences between them, but also incompatible differences. Does the identity and individuation of objects also depend on both the role of things as unifying compatible properties and their role as excluding incompatible ones? Hegel says:

> ...these *diverse aspects*...are *specifically determined*. White is white only in opposition to black, and so on, and the Thing is a One precisely by being opposed to others. But it is not as a One that it excludes others from itself...it is through its *determinateness* that the thing excludes others. Things are therefore in and for themselves determinate; they have properties by which they distinguish themselves from others.[8]

The first claim here is that the thing as a one is in some sense opposed to other things, or "excludes them from itself." Talk of the thing as an excluding one invokes the role of objects as units of account for incompatibilities of properties.

But the sense in which objects exclude or are opposed to other objects cannot be the same as the sense in which properties exclude or oppose one another. What would the units of account for *those* exclusions be? More deeply, we have seen that the material contrariety of properties

[8] [120].

admits of the definition of opposites in the sense of contradictories. Property *Q* is the opposite of property *P* in this sense just in case it is exhibited by all and only the objects that do not exhibit *P*. This is how not-red is related to red. An argument due to Aristotle shows that objects do not have opposites in this sense of contradictories.[9] The corresponding notion of an opposite in the ontological category of objects would have object *b* being the contradictory of object *a* just in case *b* exhibits all and only the properties not exhibited by *a*. But the properties *not* exhibited by any object always include properties that are incompatible with one another, and hence not all exhibitable by any one object. The red circular object does not exhibit the properties of being green, yellow, triangular, or rectangular. So its opposite would have to exhibit all of these properties (as well as all the other colors and shapes besides red and circular). That is impossible. The chart above has the properties of not being identical to my left little finger, and of not being identical to Bach's Second Brandenburg Concerto. Its opposite would have to have the property of being identical to both. Since they are not identical to each other, this cannot be.

So although objects both differ from and in some sense exclude one another, there is a huge structural difference between how they do and how properties differ from and exclude one another—the distinction between two kinds of difference that kicks off the whole process of explicitation and elaboration we have been rehearsing. The Aristotelian argument unfolds what turns out to have been implicit all along in the distinction between the two ontological categories of properties and objects. The key to the difference, the distinction between them, lies in their relation to exclusive difference: the difference between their relations to this kind of difference.

How are we to think of objects as being identified and individuated, by contrast to the ways properties are? The answer Hegel offers in the passage above is surely right as far as it goes: they are identified and individuated by their properties. This response reinforces the order of explanation being identified here as Hegels: from (ur)properties to objects—reversing the extensionalist Tarskian order of explanation. In virtue of their role as hosting co-compatible properties, objects as 'also's merely differ from one another insofar as they host different sets of co-compatible properties. In virtue of their role as excluding properties incompatible with those they host, objects as "excluding one"s exclude one another insofar as some of the co-compatible

[9] Book V of the *Categories*. [ref.]

properties exhibited by one are incompatible with some of the co-compatible properties exhibited by another.

Here we see another aspect of the contrast in orders of explanation between the Tarskian extensionalist tradition and Hegel's metaphysics of universals and particulars. The extensionalist tradition offers an answer to the question about how the identity and individuation of objects relates to that of properties: Leibniz's Law. It comprises two parts, a weaker and a stronger claim:

LL1: The Indiscernibility of Identicals.

LL2: The Identity of Indiscernibles.

(LL1) says that identical objects must have all the same properties. (LL2) says that objects with all the same properties are identical. The identity of indiscernibles is stronger than the indiscernibility of identicals in that it seems to depend on there being "enough" properties: enough to distinguish all the objects that are really distinct. As it arises in the extensionalist framework, Leibniz's Law appeals only to the mere difference of properties and the mere difference of objects. It becomes controversial how to apply it when modally robust properties are in the picture.[10] How do these principle look in an environment where exclusive difference of properties is also in play, as well as mere difference?

The Indiscernibility of Identicals says that mere difference of properties is sufficient for mere difference of objects. The Identity of Indiscernibles says that merely different objects have at least merely different properties. I think Hegel endorses these principles. But his talk of objects as excluding one another suggests that he also endorses a further, stronger principle: different objects not only have *different* properties, they have *incompatible* properties. We might call this principle the "Exclusivity of Objects." Such a view would satisfy three criteria of adequacy, the first two of which are set by the passage most recently quoted above.

- It would underwrite talk of objects as excluding one another.
- It would do so by appealing to the more primitive notion of properties excluding one another.

[10] I discuss this issue in Chapter Six and the second half of Chapter One of *From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars* [Harvard University Press, 2014].

- And it would respect the differences between property-exclusion and object-exclusion that are enforced by the Aristotelian argument showing that objects cannot have contradictories definable from their exclusions (in the case of properties, their contrarieties) in the way that properties do.

In effect, the Exclusivity of Objects says that it never happens that two objects are distinguished by their role as things-as-alsos combining different compatible properties, according to the discernibility of non-identicals version of (LL2) unless they are *also* distinguished by their role as things-as-excluding-ones. There is no mere difference of properties distinguishing objects without exclusive difference of properties (having incompatible properties) distinguishing them. This is a topic on which Leibniz's Law is silent.

The principle of the Exclusivity of Objects holds even within the extensionalist context. For even there it is denied that two objects could differ (merely differ) just by having different merely or compatibly different properties. Taking our cue from the appeal to identity-properties used to illustrate the Aristotelian argument that objects cannot have contradictories, we can notice that if *a* and *b* are indeed not identical, then *a* will have the property of <u>being identical to *a*</u> and *b* will have the property of <u>being identical to *b*</u>. If *a* and *b* are not identical, then nothing can have both properties; they are not merely different properties, they are exclusively different. It is impossible for any object that has the one property to have the other.

So thinking about things from the extensionalist direction, beginning with mere differences of objects and identifying merely different properties in effect with sets of them, does yield a version of the principle of Exclusivity of Objects. If object *a* is red and object *b* differs from it by not having that property, then appeal to the notion of formal or abstract negation yields the result that *b* has the property that is the contradictory of red. It has the property <u>not-red</u>. That property is exclusively different from <u>red</u>, in that it is a property of formal negation that it is *logically* impossible for any object to have both properties simultaneously. The fact that the principle of the Exclusivity of Objects, that merely different objects will have not only compatibly different properties but also incompatibly different ones, arises early in the Hegelian order of explanation and late in the extensionalist one is a consequence and reflection of the two

orders of explanation regarding the relations between material contrariety and formal contradictoriness that they adopt.

For distinguishing at the outset compatibly from incompatibly different properties, as Hegel does, commits one to a picture of properties as coming in compatible families of incompatible properties, as in the paradigmatic case of shapes and colors of monochromatic Euclidean plane figures. If objects *a* and *b* differ merely in compatible properties, they differ in properties drawn from different families of incompatibles. For example, *a* is red and *b* is square. But for them to be distinguished from each other thereby, *a* must not also be square and *b* must not also be red. But if *a* is not square, it will exhibit some other shape, incompatible with being square, and if *b* is not red it will exhibit some other color, incompatible with being red. But then *a* and *b* will have properties that are not merely different from one another, but incompatible with one another. That is just what the Exclusivity of Objects claims. According to this picture, kinds of things are characterized by which compatible families of incompatible properties they must exhibit. Sounds can be shapeless and colorless—though they must have some pitch and volume. But any monochromatic Euclidean plane figure must have both shape and color on pain of not qualifying as a determinate particular of that kind.

In a sense, then, for the identity and individuation of objects, the exclusiveness of objects, which appeals to exclusive difference of properties, is more basic in the Hegelian order of explanation than Leibniz's Law, which appeals to mere difference of properties.

VI

This observation completes the rehearsal of the argument that elaborates what is implicit in the idea of the contents of sensory consciousness as what would be expressed in a feature-placing vocabulary, through the consideration of what is implicit in the requirement that the features articulating those contents must be *determinate*, through the consideration of the relation of negation and universality, to the much more finely structured idea of those contents as

presenting a world consisting of empirical objects with many observable properties. We are now in a position to understand what Hegel is after when, in the opening introductory paragraphs of the *Perception* chapter, he says such things as:

> Perception…takes what is present to it as universal.[11]
>
> As it has turned out…it is merely the character of positive universality which is at first observed and developed.[12]
>
> Only perception contains negation.[13]
>
> Being…is a universal in virtue of its having mediation or the negative within it; when it *expresses* this in its immediacy, it is a *differentiated, determinate* property.[14]
>
> Since the principle of the object, the universal, is in its simplicity a *mediated* universal, the object must express this its nature in its own self. This it does by showing itself to be *the thing with many properties*.[15]

In these passages Hegel describes a path from *universality*, through unpacking the requirement of the *determinateness* of universals, to *negation* (and mediation), fetching up with the universal/particular structure of the thing with many properties. I have told the story somewhat differently, but not, I think, irreconcilably so. The official result inherited from the *Sense Certainty* chapter is the realization by sensory self-consciousness that it must understand its immediate sense knowledge as having contents that are repeatable in the sense of being universal. (Not only in this sense, as we have seen.) So that is where Hegel picks up the story in *Perception*. I understand the subsequent invocation of determinateness and negation to be a reminder that what drove empirical consciousness understanding itself according to the categories of sense certainty to the realization that repeatability as universality must be involved was precisely considerations of the determinateness of sense knowledge as involving negation. So I have told the story of sensory consciousness understanding itself as perceiving starting with the distinction between two ways in which sense contents came to be seen to differ already in the experience of sense certainty.

The passage I want to focus on at this point is one in which Hegel summarizes what we will learn, by talking about

> …sensuous universality, that is, the *immediate* unity of being and the negative…[16]

[11] [111].
[12] [114].
[13] [111].
[14] [113].
[15] [111].
[16] [115].

For here he is announcing that in this chapter we get our introduction to one of his master-ideas, that *determinateness* should be understood as a kind of *identity* constituted by *difference*, unity articulated by disparity. (That it is determinate *sensuous* universality is why the sort of unity of being and the negative is characterized as "immediate." I have glossed this as what I called "immediacy of origin," the fact that the episodes of sensory awareness being considered are passively elicited by the exercise of noninferential differential responsive capacities.) Though he has other big ideas, this is the central structural innovation of his thought about what he calls "logic", which only later in the story is differentiated into a semantics addressing the structure of the subjective realm of thought and an ontology or metaphysics addressing the structure of the objective realm of being. One of my main interpretive claims is that determinate negation or material incompatibility on the side of the thinking subjects is *deontic* incompatibility (a matter of commitment and entitlement) and on the side of the objects thought about is *alethic* incompatibility (a matter of necessity and possibility), and that Hegel's idealism is a story about the unity constituted by *these* different kinds of differences. But that is a story for another occasion.

What we have been exploring is the metaphysical fine structure of what Hegel invokes in this passage as "the negative." One of Hegel's own summaries is this:

> …the thing as the truth of perception reaches its culmination to the extent that it is necessary to develop that here. It is
>
> α) the indifferent passive universality, the also of the many properties, or, rather, matters.
>
> ß) the negation generally as simple, that is, the one, the excluding of contrasted properties, and
>
> γ) the many properties themselves, the relation of the two first moments: The negation, as it relates itself to the indifferent element and extends itself within it as a range of differences; the point of individuality in the medium of enduring existence radiating out into multiplicity.[17]

In fact, I have argued that Hegel's metaphysical analysis of the fine structure of the aristotelian object-with-many-properties, and his derivation of it from the concept of

[17] [115].

determinate universality, is substantially more intricate than this summary indicates. As on offer in the *Perception* chapter, it is a constellation of no less than ten interrelated kinds of difference. We began by distinguishing

1. mere or "indifferent" [gleichgültig] difference of compatible universals

from

2. exclusive difference of incompatible universals.

This brought into view the

3. metadifference between mere and exclusive difference.

This is the first intracategorial metadifference, between differences relating universals to universals. It is a kind of exclusive difference, since the universals must be either compatible or incompatible. (One could use the terminology differently, so that exclusively different universals were also merely different. But this does not seem to be how Hegel uses the terms.) Within exclusive difference, two species that can be related by two opposing orders of explanation:

4. material contrariety, corresponding to determinate negation,

and

5. formal contradictoriness, corresponding to abstract logical negation.

There is then also the

6. metadifference between determinate and abstract negation logical negation.

This is the second intracategorial metadifference, between differences relating universals to universals. These are not exclusively, but only compatibly different. Contradictories are a kind of contrary: minimal contraries.

Implicit in the concept of repeatables as universals is the

7. difference between universals and particulars.

This is the the first intercategorial difference. It, too, is a kind of exclusive difference.

Implicit in the concept of particulars in relation to universals is the

8. difference between two roles they play:
    - particulars as 'also's, that is as medium hosting a community of compatible universals, and
    - particulars as "exclusive ones," that is as units of account repelling incompatible properties.

This is the first intracategorial difference between roles played by particulars. These are what we might call *strongly* compatibly different roles, since *every* particular not only *can* but *must* play both.

Corresponding to this difference on the side of particulars is the

9. difference between two roles universals play with respect to particulars:
- universals as related to an inclusive 'One' in community with other compatible universals, and
- universals as excluding incompatible universals associated with different exclusive 'One's.

Finally, there is the

10. Difference between universals and particulars that consists in the fact that universals *do* and particulars do *not* have contradictories or opposites.

Unless the distinctions and intricate interrelations between these different ways in which things can be said to differ from or negate others are kept firmly in mind, nothing but confusion can result in thinking about Hegel's metaphysics of negation. As an illustration, both determinate properties and objects can be understood as, to use a favorite Hegelian phrase, "negations of the negation." But in very different ways, accordingly as both what is negated and the negating of it must have senses drawn from different elements of the list above. For instance the first negating of a negation is intracategorial, among universals, and the second is intercategorial, distinguishing particulars from universals. In the first case, the identity of a determinate property consists in how it negates or differs from all of its material contraries. Each is in sense (2) the negation of the property in question. And it is by being the contrary of, negating, all of its exclusive contraries that it is the determinate property that it is. This is one sense in which universals as such "contain negation within themselves," which is why perception, which "takes what is present to it as universal," thereby itself "contains negation." In the second case, according to the order of explanation I have attributed to Hegel, particulars are understood in terms of their exclusive difference, of types (7) and (9), from universals. Since the universals are the determinate universals they are because of their negations of one another, particulars can be understood as negations of the

negations that articulate those universals. They are of the category that does *not* negate others of its category in the way universals do negate others of their category. These two examples of kinds of identity that are intelligible as constituted by negating a negation are obviously quite different, due to the difference in the kinds of negation.

VII

This is the structure I take it that Hegel elaborates from the requirement of *determinateness* of the repeatable features characteristic of empirical consciousness understanding itself a sense certainty. It is introduced in the first five paragraphs of *Perception*. In the body of the chapter, he recounts three large movements of the experience of empirical consciousness understanding itself as perceiving. Here we, Hegel's phenomenological consciousness, look on at how this underlying structure manifests itself to the phenomenal consciousness by showing the inadequacy of the abstractions that articulate its self-understanding. The overall difficulty is that this sort of self-consciousness still understands the sense in which the properties it perceives are given to it immediately: not only in terms of immediacy of their origin, but still also in terms of the immediacy of their content. As Hegel puts it, according to its self-conception:

> It has only to *take* it, to confine itself to pure apprehension of it…If consciousness itself did anything in taking what is given, it would by such adding or subtraction alter the truth.[18]

This means that

> His criterion of truth is therefore *self-identity*, and his behavior consists in apprehending the object as self-identical.[19]

The trouble is that diversity (dissimilarity, diversity of moments) is also explicitly a feature of the content of sense perception as determinate.[20] The three movements of the experience of

[18] [116].
[19] [116].
[20] Paraphrase of the final sentences of [116].

perceiving consciousness are conceptual strategies—each ultimately unsuccessful—for explicitly reconciling the elements of unity and diversity, self-identity and difference, implicit in ground-level determinate sense experience. In accordance with its self-conception, Hegel says, any failure to reconcile these diverse moments must be attributed not to a feature of what is perceived, but to the perceiving of it.

In general, what we see is that so long as empirical consciousness understanding itself according to the categories of perception seeks to its experience as exhibiting independent principles of unity and disparity ("these empty abstractons of a 'singleness' and a 'universality' opposed to it"[21]) that are somehow bolted together to yield a conception of the multifarious kinds of identity-through-difference (" 'being-for-self' burdened with opposition"[22]) we have seen to be implicit in the notion of determinateness, it is doomed to confusion and failure. In its first experience, it notices that what it takes to be the immediately simple, self-identical unity it experiences essentially involves multiplicity, diversity, and difference. (Hegel walks us through several of the dimensions of identity-through-difference retailed in the previous section.) Empirical consciousness understanding itself as perceiving cannot understand how on this basis *e pluribus unum*, one arising out of many, is possible. Identity and diversity are exclusively different features. So it must be impossible for one single, self-identical content to exhibit both. In particular, one cannot conceive of objects as determinate apart from their relation to their properties, and one cannot conceive of the properties, in terms of which objects are determinately what they are, as determinately what *they* are apart from their relations (of exclusion) to other properties. So, one cannot understand either *objects* or *properties* as both *determinate* and *independent* of their relations to other things (properties to other properties, objects to properties, and objects to other objects).

Since those sorts of unities are not intelligible according its guiding metaconception, perceiving consciousness takes it that it must be making some sort of a mistake in its taking-in of what is given to it. Either the object of perception is unified and self-identical, and multiplicity is being spuriously added by the perceiving subject, or what is perceived is really diverse and a spurious unity is being conferred by the perceiving subject. What drives the second experience

[21] [130].
[22] [130].

of perceiving consciousness is the question of where to locate *responsibility for* diversity or unity.[23] This is really the issue throughout the body of the chapter. The first metaexperience sought for both in the objective realm of what is perceived. In the second, the loci of responsibility considered are the perceived object and the perceiving subject. The second strategy of perceiving consciousness—still laboring under an understanding of identity as requiring autonomy, excluding essential relation to something other—is to respond to the failure of its first strategy by assigning a role to consciousness in making sense of the complex constellation of unity and diversity required by determinateness.

One way to do that is to take the thing experienced to be indeed one and autonomous, but to be experienced *as* exhibiting diverse properties only because of its relation to our various senses.

> We get the entire diversity of these aspects, not from the Thing, but form ourselves, and they fall asunder this way for us because the eye is quite distinct from the tongue…[24]

The idea here is the one Shelley expresses in a passage in *Adonais* where he imagines the "white radiance of eternity" refracted through the multicolored stained glass of the mind to yield the multiplicity we see:

> The One remains, the many change and pass;
> Heaven's light forever shines, Earth's shadows fly;
> Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
> Stains the white radiance of Eternity.

The Shelleyan strategem cannot rescue perceiving consciousness' commitment to understanding identity as involving no substructure of difference from or relation to others, though. For the "various properties which seem to be properties of the Thing,"[25] the "diverse aspects for which consciousness accepts responsibility," are still "*specifically determined*. White is white only in opposition to black…."[26] So the difficulty of understanding identity as constituted through (exclusive) difference is not solved on the subjective side of perceiving consciousness. And on

[23] Hegel invokes this issue explicitly by using the phrase "nimmt (sie) auf sich" (takes it upon itself, takes it up), in [118], [120], [122], and again in summary in [131].
[24] [119].
[25] [119].
[26] [120].

the side of the objective perceived thing, whose unity or identity construed in terms of autonomy is supposed to be preserved by relegating manyness to consciousness,

> …it is in its *determinateness* that the thing excludes others. Things are…in and for themselves determinate; they have properties by which they distinguish themselves from others.[27]

The way in which exclusive intracategorial difference is essential to the identity both of properties and of things remains a problem even after responsibility for the diversity of properties has been assigned to one pole of the intentional nexus and responsibility for the unity of the thing has been assigned to the other.

And the converse Kantian version of this second strategy fares no better. The idea here is that "the Thing itself is the *subsistence of the many diverse and independent properties*," and that "positing these properties as a oneness is the work of consciousness alone."[28] For Kant, what is given is a sensory *manifold* of intuition. Imposing unity on that manifold is solely the responsibility and the result of the work of the understanding. But once again, the identity of each of the diverse properties consists in its exclusive difference from others, and the specific unity imposed on some compatible set of them when they are gathered together into an object as a one as 'also' is distinguished from other such specific unities only by the exclusive difference of some of their various properties.

So dividing responsibility for unity and responsibility for diversity between subjective and objective poles of the intentional nexus, between the act of perceiving and what is perceived, will not solve the underlying problem. Both perceptual experiencings and what is perceptually experienced must be understood as determinate. That means both must exhibit the aristotelian structure of particularity and universality, which implicitly, but essentially, exhibits a fine structure articulated by different sorts of difference or negation, a complex constellation of kinds of categorial identity constituted by relations of different sorts of difference.

Hegel sees one last desperate strategy as available to empirical consciousness understanding itself according to the metaconceptual commitments of perceiving, in attempting to salvage its hopelessly simple-minded atomistic understanding of identity as consisting solely in self-

[27] [120].
[28] [121].

relation, so excluding any essential relation to what is different from it. Interestingly enough—given the account I have offered above of the metaphysical analysis of the aristotelian structure of objects-with-properties I take Hegel to be offering, and its alternatives—the third strategy he considers is what I there called the Tractarian version of the Tarskian extensionalist order of explanation. This begins with mere difference of simple ("elementary") objects, and construes the variety of their properties in terms of their inessential (optional, contingent) relations to one another.[29]

This third strategy, too, is bound to fail. Each thing is supposed to be the determinate thing it is, and so distinguished from other things. But what makes it determinately different is just its properties, now conceived as its relation to other things. So those relations, the way it exclusively differs from others, are essential to its being the thing it is.

> The thing is posited as being *for itself*, or as the absolute negation of all otherness, therefore as purely *self*-related negation; but…the Thing has its essential being in another Thing.[30]

The atomistic conception of identity as involving no essential differences must be abandoned.

Rehearsing the lessons of the three experiences of perceiving consciousness, Hegel says that it begins when

> From sensuous being it turned into a universal…but a universal *afflicted with an opposition*; for this reason the universality splits into the extremes of singular individuality and universality…These pure determinatenesses…are only a 'being-for-self' that is burdened with a 'being-for-another.'[31]

What is required is a shift in understanding the relations between "the universality which is opposed to and conditioned by singular being":

> But these two contradictory extremes are not merely *alongside each other* but in a single unity, or, in other words, the defining characteristic common to both, viz. 'being-for-self' is burdened with opposition generally…[32]

[29] In [123] and [124].
[30] [126].
[31] [129].
[32] [130].

When fully articulated, the result is the complex structure of particulars and universals involving ten different sorts of negation or difference expounded in sections V and VI above. The holistic way in which the intricately interrelated items in it must be understood in terms of their relations to one another is what Hegel calls "understanding," and the objects understood he calls "forces." They are the topic of the final chapter of the *Conciousness* section of the *Phenomenology*, called "Force and Understanding."

END

Three Essays on the Metaphysics of Objects and Properties

Chapter Two

Sortals, Identity, and Modality:
The Metaphysical Significance of the
Modal Kant-Sellars Thesis

I. Sortals and Identity

Frege explicated the distinction between predicates, such as 'red,' or 'heavy,' which are characterized semantically by their associated circumstances and consequences of application, and sortalizing predicates or kind-terms, such as 'dog,' or 'electron,' which in addition have associated practices of identifying and individuating the things to which they apply. Sortals are expressions for which the question can arise whether or not the things they apply to are the *same* K: the same dog, the same electron (direction, shape, number)—perhaps in different circumstances (such as times) or differently specified. Quine calls sortal expressions "count nouns," because their associated criteria of identity and individuation make it possible to count them: to say (or ask) *how many* Ks there are in some collection.[33]

[33] The two principal species of kind-terms are distinguished in that things to which sortals apply can be counted (a sense has been given to questions of the form "How many?") while things that fall under mass nouns can be measured (a sense has been given to questions of the form "How much?"). Mass nouns are sortalized by introducing units of measurement: one can count *liters* of water and *grams* of gold. Those quantity expressions give sense to questions such as: "Is this the same *volume* or *mass* of water as that is of gold?" They are introduced by abstraction, but the equivalence relations that serve as abstractors are embedded in and defined in terms of much richer structures, generated by *a*symmetric, transitive (only the details of implementation depend on whether they

Philosophical confusions have resulted from the existence in natural languages of pseudosortals, such as 'object', 'thing', and 'item'. These expressions occupy the grammatical places held by genuine sortals, but do *not* have associated criteria of identity, which are semantically essential to real sortals. For this reason, they do not semantically support counting. There is no definite answer to the question "How many things are on my desk?". Are all the parts of things also things—even spatiotemporal parts of indivisible particles (if such there be)? Are shadows (and their parts) things? Sometimes these pseudosortals function as anaphoric prosortals: "There are books, and papers, and the remains of today's lunch on my desk, and all those things need to be cleared away." Sometimes they are just sortal placeholders, where the specific sortal they are to be taken to stand in for are to be gathered from the context: "What a nice skirt! Oh, that old thing?" But sometimes they stand for an attempt to quantify over all possible genuine sortals—as an otherwise uncontexted request to enumerate the things on the desk would be. Sortally unrestricted quantification (of the sort Frege is supposed to have introduced) runs the risk of having to be understood this way—though it is better to think of the domains of quantification as specified in a semantic metalanguage, using genuine sortals providing criteria of identity that do permit counting. (Of course, one can *stipulate* a meaning for 'object': by 'object' I shall mean fundamental physical particle, and all mereological sums of

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are reflexive or irreflexive) *comparative* relations exhibiting distinctive kinds of higher-level symmetry. In the case of volume, mass, and utility (the measure of preference) these include additivity and the existence of a zero. The process of introducing units of measurement for mass nouns that gives sense to questions such as "Is this the same volume of water as that?" should not be confused with the only superficially similar process of sortalizing predicate adjectives (though abstraction is involved inboth). One can indeed introduce sortals that give sense to questions such as "Is this the same hue or shade of red as that?", when the latter is *not* based on the introduction of a space of measures (the color-sphere articulated by the three dimensions of hue, saturation, and intensity, each defined by its own sort of asymmetric comparison of more and less) but just on the basis of a (supposed) equivalence relation of a kind of indistinguishability. ('Supposed' because transitivity notoriously fails for indistinguishability of shade; so much the worse for the rough-and-ready notion of a shade of color.)

them. One must keep in mind, however, that one thereby runs the risk—as I'll argue below—of ruling out as objects the things falling under practically all other sortals.)

A question of long-standing interest is how we should understand the relations between the two central aspects of the use of sortal expressions: their criteria of application and their criteria of identity.[34] On one view, these can vary independently, in the sense that two sortals can have different criteria of application and the same criteria of identity, or the same criteria of application and different criteria of identity. Examples of the former case are not far to seek. Phase sortals, such as 'kitten,' 'tadpole,' and 'child' are applicable only to proper subsets of what 'cat,' 'frog,' and 'human' are applicable to. But they are individuated and counted the same way. Two different children are two different humans, and two different humans who are children are two different children. The other sort of case is more contentious and difficult to illustrate. A principle candidate example is 'passenger' and 'person riding in a vehicle' (or something similar—the details of the criteria of application are not the point here). Passengers are important to airlines, and they count them. USAirways says that in 2010 it flew 59,809,367 passengers. It did not fly that many different people. When I flew from Pittsburgh to San Francisco, I got counted as a different passenger than I did when I flew back. But it was only one person getting counted as two passengers in those two plane-trips.

[34] I will use the traditional vocabulary of "criteria", subject to the proviso that there is no implication that the criteria are explicit, that there must be statable principles in the vicinity. Talk of "criteria of identity" is talk about aspects of the practice of using count nouns.

Impressed by examples such as these (and others that individuate down rather than up, such as 'surpersons' which are people, but such that two people with the same surname are the same surperson), Geach argued that identity itself must be understood as sortally relative.[35] This view has been widely, and I think convincingly, objected to as mislocating the sortal-relativity.[36] The idea is that the criteria of identity should be associated with the terms related by identity locutions, rather than those locutions. I agree that the most interesting issues concern the relations between the way identity claims interact with the constellation of criteria of identity, sortals semantically governed by them, and terms that fall under those sortals. I think that putting the issue of the supposed sortal-relativity of identity at center stage has in many ways bent this discussion out of shape. It has in any case become clear that the need to relativize identity does not follow from the claim that prompted it. This is the claim that there can be individuals *a* and *b* that are Fs and are the *same* F, but are also Gs, and are *different* Gs. Here F and G might be 'person' and 'passenger' or 'surperson' and 'person.' It is this claim on which I want to focus. It is accepted by many (such as Gupta and Gibbard) who reject the conclusion Geach draws from it.[37] Can the same thing (I'll use the pseudosortal here so as not to prejudge important issues) fall under two sortals used according to divergent criteria of identity?

[35] Geach, P.T. "Identity" *Review of Metaphysics* 1967 21:3-12, reprinted in Geach, P.T. *Logic Matters* [Blackwells Publishers, 1972]. Also Geach, P.T. "Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity" in Munitz, M. (ed.) *Logic and Ontology* [New York University Press, 1973].

[36] For instance, Perry, J. "The Same F" *The Philosophical Review* 1970 64: 181-200. Gupta, A. *The Logic of Common Nouns* [Yale University Press, 1980].

[37] Gupta *ibid*. Gibbard, A. "Contingent Identity" *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 1975 4:2 pp. 187-221.

Let us look at the question more closely. Geach's view can usefully be codified in the form of two claims:[38]

D) '$a = b$' is an incomplete expression. One should, in order to complete it, say the same *what* *a* and *b* are. A full identity statement is always of the form '$a =_F b$' (read: *a* is the same *F* as *b*').

R) It is possible for *a* to be the same *F* as *b*, while not being the same *G* as *b*.

(This would be put by Geach, in accordance with (D), as $a =_F b$ and *Ga* and *Gb* and $a \neq_G b$.) As just indicated, I take the upshot of the (extensive) literature in this area to be that (R) has emerged as the fundamental issue, with (D) taking its place as one optional diagnosis and analysis of how (R) could be true. The key issue here is that for (R) to be true, *a* and *b* must be terms that can fall under two sortals whose criteria of identity diverge. On this account, what we could call "strong cross-sortal identities" must be intelligible, and some of them must be true. The qualification 'strong' indicates that the sortals in question are associated with different criteria of identity.

The criteria of identity are what are used to count *F*'s and *G*'s. If the criteria of identity are the same, only weak cross-sortal identities are underwritten. Thus the inference:

1) All kittens are cats,
2) There are at least 10 million kittens in the U.S.,

[38] The names are due to Wiggins, D. *Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity* [Blackwell Publishing, 1967], Wiggins D. *Sameness and Substance* [Blackwell Publishing Co. 1980]. I follow E. Zemach's [Phil. Studies **26** (1974) pp. 207-218.] formGibbard ulation here.

therefore

3) There are at least 10 million cats in the U.S.,

is a good one. The difference between 'kitten' and 'cat' is one of criteria of application: everything 'kitten' applies to, 'cat' applies to, but not *vice versa*. But they have the same criteria of identity. If *a* and *b* are the same kitten (different kittens) then *a* and *b* are the same cat (different cats). And if *a* and *b* are the same cat (different cats), and they are kittens, then they are the same kitten (different kittens. Identities of the form

This kitten = This cat

where both expressions refer to *a*, are *weak* cross-sortal identities. That is why the inference goes through.

4) All passengers are people,

5) USAirways flew at least 59 million passengers last year,

therefore

6) USAirways flew at least 59 million people last year,

is not a good one. As with 'kitten' and 'cat', the criteria of application of 'passenger' apply to only a subset of things the criteria of application of 'person' do. But if *a* and *b* are the same person and they are both passengers, it does not follow that they are the same passenger. Identities of the form

7) This passenger = This person

are *strong* cross-sortal identities. That is why the inference does not go through.

The principal difficulty with embracing (R) is that it stands in tension with the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals: the claim

LL) If $a = b$, then for all properties P, Pa iff Pb.[39]

Let us name the passenger who is Bob flying from Pittsburgh to San Francisco on that day "Procyon," and the passenger who is Bob flying back from San Francisco to Pittsburgh on the next day "Lotor." Then consider the property

P_1) …would still have existed if Bob had never flown from Pittsburgh to San Francisco.

Bob has that property. Procyon does not (assuming "this passenger", used to fix the reference of the name, individuates at least as finely as "this person traveling on this itinerary").[40] Indeed, the property

P_2) … = Lotor

is a property that, on the assumption of the intelligibility and possible truth of strong cross-sortal identities, Bob has and Procyon does not. These observations bring that assumption into conflict with the indiscernibility of identicals, (LL).

Are weak cross-sortal identities any better off? Supposing that kittens must be cats younger than one year, doesn't

[39] The designation 'LL' reflects the fact that the indiscernibility of identicals is one half—the more plausible half—of Leibniz's Law. The other half, the identity of indiscernibles, is plausible only in the context of strong auxiliary hypotheses concerning the expressive power of the language in which the properties are specified.

[40] Not all such subjunctive or counterfactuals involving Procyon are false. Procyon *would* still have existed if Bob's flight from Pittsburgh to San Francisco had taken off 10 minutes later than it actually did. Other issues, such as what to say in case that flight had been cancelled and Bob rebooked on another airline, are less clear—but matter only to airlines.

P_3) …would still exist after one year of life

distinguish this cat, whom we have named Archie, from this kitten, whom we have named Paws? No. On the supposition that kitten-cat identities are only weakly cross-sortal, that is, that 'kitten' and 'cat' have the same criteria of identity and only different (nested) criteria of application, when I say "I hereby name this kitten (=this young cat) 'Paws'," I am naming the *cat*, who is now young. The fact that the reference-fixing designation quickly fails to be true of him does not alter the reference that was fixed—no more in this case than for any other name. (Other adjectivally restricted sortals, such as "red car", work the same way: the restriction applies to the criteria of application, while the criteria of identity go with the unrestricted sortal. If I painted this red car green it would be the same car, even though it would no longer be a red car.)

It will be helpful at this point to consider another sort of example, adapted from Gibbard.[41] Suppose a mold is made in the shape of a giant man, and in it plasticine clay is mixed up from calcium carbonate, petroleum jelly, and stearic acid. A lump of plasticine clay in the shape of a giant man results. At this point someone introduces the name 'Goliath' to refer to the resulting statue, and also introduces the name 'Lumpl' to refer to the lump of modeling clay. Some time later, both are incinerated and destroyed. We are to think of the two, the statue and the lump of clay, as having come into existence simultaneously, and going out of existence simultaneously. Should we say that they are not only spatio-temporally coincident, but identical: that Goliath = Lumpl? If so, that is a strong cross-sortal identity. For 'statue' and 'lump of clay'

[41] Op.cit.

have quite different criteria of identity. That difference manifests itself in the subjunctive-dispositional properties that distinguish them. Lumpl, but not Goliath, has the property:

P_4) …would not have been destroyed had it been reshaped into a sphere.

Lumps can survive radical reshaping, but statues cannot.

Because by definition the sortals involved in strong cross-sortal identities are associated with different criteria of identity, the items identified will always be distinguished by their possession of different subjunctive-dispositional properties: those that express the different conditions under which they would remain Ks, or would remain the same K. Another way of putting that point is that strong cross-sortal identities are always *contingent* identities. Even if Lumpl and Goliath are identical, they might not have been. For instance had Lumpl been reshaped into a sphere, it would not then have been identical to the statue Goliath. Assertions of strong cross-sortal identities violate the indiscernibility of identicals—but in a distinctive way. We could say that the lump of clay Lumpl and the statue Goliath, or the passenger Procyon and the person Bob, during their coincidence share all their *actual* properties, differing only in some of their *modal* properties.

Notice that Kripke rejects this possibility. If the terms involved in an identity claim are modally rigid designators, as he takes names to be (we could just stipulate that the names we have introduced in these examples are abbreviations of descriptions that have been modally rigidified by applying Kaplan's 'dthat' operator, and so pick out the same things in all worlds), then if the identity claim is true, it is necessarily true. Identity claims can be contingently true

only if they are read *de dicto*: Barack Obama is the 44th U.S. President. He might not have been (that identity is only contingently true), in the sense that the *dictum* "Barack Obama is the 44th U.S. President," might not have been true. But read *de re*, we use the description "the 44th U.S. President" to pick out a person in *this* world, and then follow *him* through other worlds. In effect, my argument above was that, so long as they are read *de re*, cross-sortal identities involving terms falling under phase sortals (and indeed any members of the genus of adjectivally restricted sortals of which they are a species) and terms falling under the sortals of which they pick out phases are not merely contingently true. On Kripke's understanding, the use of names and demonstratives ("this very man") enforces the *de re* reading. Although he does not draw explicitly this conclusion, ruling out contingent *de re* identity has the consequence of ruling out the truth of *any* strong cross-sortal identity claims.

Who is right: Gibbard, who thinks that "Lumpl = Goliath" is true, or Kripke, who claims it cannot be? Gibbard constructs his example using proper names for the clay and the statue, rather than just descriptions, to show that Kripke is wrong at least in thinking that understanding proper names as modally rigid (so forcing *de re* readings of the identity claims) by itself settles the issue. We have put ourselves in a position to see that what is really at issue is the intelligibility and truth of strong cross-sortal *de re* identities. What matters is the sortals, not the modal rigidity of the expressions that fall under them. If true, those strong cross-sortal *de re* identities can be true only contingently. The intelligibility of such identities depends, in turn, on restricting the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals so that it does not apply to subjunctive-dispositional properties. For such properties will always distinguish the terms of strong cross-sortal identities.

II. Empirical Descriptive Vocabulary and Subjunctive Dispositional Vocabulary

We have reached the crux of the issue. In order to be entitled to assert strong cross-sortal identities, one must distinguish between subjunctive-dispositional properties—those having to do with what *would* be the case *if*…—and some base of nonmodal properties. For one must exclude the former from the scope of the indiscernibility of identicals, arguing that that principle applies only to properties that do *not* depend one what *would* happen if…. The question I want to raise is whether such a distinction can be made out.

Of course, the idea of restricting the applicability of Leibniz's Law to a privileged subset of properties is an old one. The question of how to make sense of the possibility of the persistence of objects through change is a special case of understanding criteria of identity—where the index of variation is time, rather than possible world. Aristotle responds by distinguishing essential from accidental properties. In effect, he suggests that identicals need only be indiscernible with respect to essential properties. The dog barking now can be the same dog as the silent dog earlier, if whether it is barking or silent is not essential to its being the dog that it is.

Thought of in the most general terms, the question is whether there is, and whether there must be, a distinction between properties P for which the inference

LL1) For Ks *a* and *b*, if P*a* and ~P*b*, then *a* and *b* are not the same K,

does hold, and those for which it does *not*.[42] (LL1) follows from (LL). We can call the claim that there can be no properties for which (LL) does not hold "identity absolutism."

Notice that it does *not* follow from (LL1) *failing* to hold of some kind K and property P that possession of P is *accidental* to being the same K, in the sense that whether or not one possesses that property makes no difference to being the same K. For if, as we should, we take seriously the nonmonotonicity of the material inferences involved, it could be that although (LL1) is true for K and P_1, it is not true for K and the conjunctive property $P_1\&P_2$. That failure of (LL1) is compatible in turn with (LL1) holding for K and $P_1\&P_2\&P_3$, failing again for $P_1\&P_2\&P_3\&P_4$, and so on in a never-ending oscillating hierarchy. For this reason, the presence of a distinction for kind K between properties for which (LL1) holds and those for which it does not does not have the consequence that there are properties which are accidental to being the same K in the stronger sense. Making that inference is not taking seriously the nonmonotonicity of material inference.

For the temporal case, perdurantism (which sees objects as having temporal parts analogous to their spatial parts) and endurantism (which sees objects as fully present at all times

[42] A different set of properties would support the inference from *b*'s not having P to *b*'s not being a K (some K or other) at all.

at which they exist, and relativizes property-possession to times) in their original, classic forms as Lewis formulated them are contrasting ways of retaining the *un*restricted applicability of the indiscernibility of identicals (as, not surprisingly, is Lewis's own counterpart theory for the modal case).[43] Beyond that, issues of how to understand identity of physical objects through time raises issues over and above those raised by modally involved properties—though not, to be sure, independent of them. I will not here enter into the intricacies of these debates, nor try to say how the hard line I am arguing for in the modal case bears on the temporal case.

Indeed, I am not going to attempt to assess or adjudicate the comparative merits of the grand strategies of holding onto the indiscernibility of identicals in unrestricted form and restricting it somehow. On the one hand, treating LL as *defining* identity provides a particularly clear concept to work with, one that yields the right answers in a number of puzzle cases. On the other hand, *some* restrictions on LL seem evidently to be in order. Intentional properties, regarding what people believe or how their other intentional states (such as desires, hopes, and so on) can be specified, are cardinal examples. This point is enforced by considering Church-style iterations of them. "No-one has ever doubted that everyone who believes that $\ulcorner Pa \urcorner$ believes that $\ulcorner Qa \urcorner$" is a context that will distinguish almost any lexically distinct substituends for *P* and *Q*. In effect, what such contexts do is enforce *de dicto* readings of the corresponding identities.[44] What

[43] David Lewis 1976, "Survival and Identity", in Amelie Rorty (ed.) *The Identities of Persons*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 117–40. Reprinted with significant postscripts in Lewis's *Philosophical Papers* volume I, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[44] The detailed account of how *de dicto* and *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitude work that I offer in Chapter Eight of *Making It Explicit* provides the theoretical tools for explicating the connection between *de dicto* readings and propositional attitude ascribing locutions that this claim relies on.

I am arguing for is only that there are no contingently true *de re* identities. My reasons are quite different from Kripke's.

What I am going to argue for is what might be called "*modal* identity absolutism." This is the claim that we should understand the indiscernibility of identicals as including within its scope *modal* properties, both implicit and explicit. What I want to contest is the viability of any version of the non-absolutist strategy that relies on distinguishing modal, subjunctive, or dispositional properties as a special class for which Leibniz's Law does *not* hold. There is an important distinction between property-specifying (predicative) vocabulary that is *explicitly* modal and vocabulary that is not explicitly modal. By "explicitly modal" vocabulary I mean vocabulary such as modal operators ('possible', 'necessary', 'contingent'…), the use of subjunctive mood ('could', 'would', 'might'…), and dispositional terms ('fragile', 'rigid', 'irascible'), which would be explicated by appeal to subjunctives and modal vocabulary ("fragile things are those which would shatter if lightly struck," "irascible people are those who would become angry if provoked").[45] One key point I want to make is that even vocabulary that is *not* explicitly modal—in particular, ordinary empirical descriptive (OED) vocabulary such as 'mass', 'cat', 'copper', and 'red'—must be understood as *implicitly* modal. By "implicitly modal vocabulary" I mean vocabulary whose applicability entails the truth of some modal, subjunctive, or dispositional claims.

[45] I have argued in Chapter Four that some important kinds of modal vocabulary can be introduced—its use specified—entirely in terms of the use of vocabulary that is not explicitly modal.

We can start by considering a particularly clear case. The concept of (Newtonian) mass essentially, and not just accidentally, is articulated by necessary connections to the concepts force and acceleration. Describing an object as having a non-zero mass commits one to the claim that (under suitable background conditions) it *would* accelerate if a non-zero force *were* applied to it, and that if it *had* accelerated, a force *would* have been applied to it. To have a non-zero mass *is*, *inter alia*, to be disposed to accelerate if and only if a non-zero force is applied. Applying this bit of OED vocabulary to something in *this* world entails claims about what *would* happen in other worlds. If those subjunctive-dispositional claims are not true, neither is the claim about the possession of mass in this world.

In much the same way, describing a coin as *copper* commits one to claims about what *would* happen *were* one to heat it to 1085° C (it would melt), and what *would* happen *were* one to rub it with a sharp diamond (it would be scratched), and a myriad of other such subjunctive-dispositional claims. Nor is being implicitly modal or modally involved, in the sense of having subjunctive-dispositional necessary conditions, a special feature of scientific or theoretical concepts. Cat and red also have such consequences of application. To be a cat is essentially, and not just accidentally, to be something that *would* die if deprived of oxygen, food, or water for long enough, if struck by lightning, if crushed by having a large lump of clay dropped on it, and so on. Red things *would* reflect light at around 7000 angstroms *if* suitably illuminated.

This thought is a core insight of Kant's, and forms the basis of his response to Hume. As he might have put it, lawful connections are already implicit in the use of ordinary empirical

descriptive concepts. That is why we cannot be in the predicament Hume thought we were in: understanding those concepts perfectly well, but having thereby no rational grip at all on what is made explicit by modal or dispositional concepts, no understanding of subjunctive (including counterfactual) inferences. Sellars codified the point in a slogan he used as the title of one of his essays: "Concepts as involving Laws, and Inconceivable without them." I call the claim that *every* empirical, descriptive concept has subjunctive-dispositional consequences, which accordingly serve as necessary conditions of its correct applicability, the "Kant-Sellars thesis about modality." According to it, there are no empirical descriptive properties that are *modally insulated*, in the sense that they can apply in one possible world regardless of what is true in any other.

III. Modal Identity Absolutism and its Consequences

The next claim I want to make is that the modal Kant-Sellars thesis is incompatible with restricting the applicability of Leibniz's Law to non-modal, i.e. modally insulated, properties, in a sense that restricts the indiscernibility required for identity to properties that are *not* dispositional or subjunctively committive. The reason is straightforward: since all empirical descriptive predicates have subjunctive-dispositional consequences, indiscernibility with respect to empirical descriptive properties requires indiscernibility with respect to all the subjunctive-

dispositional properties they entail.[46] We *have* to take SD properties into account when assessing the indiscernibility of two putatively identical things, because their applicability is a necessary condition of the applicability of ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary. So if, as everyone surely must admit, identity requires indiscernibility with respect to OED vocabulary, then according to the modal KS thesis, it requires also indiscernibility with respect to SD vocabulary.[47]

If that is all right, then there can be no true strongly cross-sortal identities. For such identities by definition relate terms falling under sortals associated with *different* criteria of identity. The difference in criteria of identity ensures that the putatively identical items will have different subjunctive, counterfactual, and dispositional properties. For they will remain the *same* K (or indeed, a K at all), under different circumstances. Thus, if the clay were *were* reshaped into a sphere, the statue Goliath, but not the lump of clay Lumpl, would be destroyed. If, as the modal Kant-Sellars thesis tells us, we cannot exclude such properties from the scope of Leibniz's Law in assessing identities, on the principle that it does not apply to subjunctive-dispositional properties, then we must conclude that in the actual world in which, by hypothesis, they coincide

[46] Is this perhaps an antecedently specifiable proper subset of subjunctive-dispositional properties generally? No. For any particular SD predicate, it is possible to construct a predicate that is nondispositional in the ordinary sense (since I am denying that there are any properties that are "nondispositional" in the sense of modally insulated) whose correct applicability entails the correct applicability of the given dispositional one.

[47] As I said of this argument in Chapter One: I think this is a strong argument. But it does not rule out in principle the possibility of partitioning modally involved predicates into two classes X and Y, insisting that only those from class X are referentially transparent (indiscernible with respect to identity, within the scope of the intersubstitution license made by identity claims), and then claiming further that some strongly cross-sortal identities come out true because the predicates/properties that modally distinguish the sortals includes only those from class Y. All I can do is point out how demanding the criteria of adequacy are for such an attempted partition, downstream of the modal Kant-Sellars thesis.

spatio-temporally, Goliath is not identical to Lumpl. If we call whatever intimate relation they *do* stand in "material constitution" of the statue by the clay, then we must conclude that (as the slogan has it) "Material constitution is not identity."

Nor can any sur-person be a person. Geach emphasizes that the criteria of application of 'person' and 'surperson' are the same: surpersons *are* persons. Only the criteria of identity are different (Gupta agrees). So something, say, me, *is* both this person and this surperson. That is a strongly cross-sortal identity. Because of the difference in criteria of identity, the person and the surperson have different subjunctive properties. If I, Bob, a person, *were* to legally change my last name, I *would* still be the same person, but *would* no longer be the same surperson as my father. If I became single-named, hence not surnamed (as is a fashion among some celebrities), I would no longer be *any* surperson, never mind the same one. But I would still be a person, and the same one. So Bob the person has the property **would survive loss of surname**, which Bob the surperson does not have. The strongly cross-sortal identity is at most contingently true. Contingent identities are intelligibly true only if the scope of Leibniz's law is restricted so as not to rule out discernibility of identicals by subjunctive-dispositional properties. But the modal Kant-Sellars thesis tells us that requires a discrimination that cannot be made, since even paradigmatically "non-modal" properties are *implicitly* modal, in the sense their instantiation entails the instantiation of *explicitly* subjunctive properties.

The same reasoning underwrites the conclusion that no passenger is identical with any person. As counterintuitive as it might sound, passengers are not people (which fact may serve

as a backhanded justification, at least conceptually, for the way airlines treat their passengers). The passenger, Procyon, and the person could be at most contingently identical, since if Bob *had* missed the plane, he *would* not have been identical to *that* passenger, Procyon. But he would still have been identical with the person, Bob. Property (P1) above discriminates Bob from the passenger Procyon. The modal KS thesis prohibits us from excluding such properties from the scope of the indiscernibility of identical, so the person and the passenger cannot be identical. I suppose that passengers are something like *roles* that persons can play: a distinctive sort of thing that can be true of them.

The modal Kant-Sellars thesis commits us to modal identity absolutism. This is the claim that the set of properties with respect to which identicals must be indiscernible must include explicitly modal (subjunctive, including counterfactual, and dispositional) properties if it includes ordinary empirical descriptive properties. That is because the modal KS thesis tells us that ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary is *implicitly* modal, in the sense that it *entails* the truth of claims formulated in SD vocabulary. Modal identity absolutism in turn entails that the only identities that can be contingently true are identities read *de dicto*. (We can force the *de re* reading by using proper names, demonstratives, or other rigid designators, or by using rigidifying operators such as Kaplan's 'dthat'.) Because strongly cross-sortal identities (whose terms can, in all the controversial cases, be rigidified) by definition relate terms falling under sortals with different criteria of identity, they could only be true contingently, and are accordingly ruled out by modal identity absolutism.

This line of argument also has significant consequences for a certain kind of project in reconstructive metaphysics. A tempting strategy, adopted by Lewis, is to turn sortal placeholders such as 'object' into genuine individuating sortals by stipulating a class of base sortals and extending it mereologically. So one might take as the base sortals some collection of kinds of subatomic particles—perhaps with the idea that they play a privileged role in explanations in fundamental physics. One stipulates that all of these (everything that falls under those base sortals) count as objects. Then, in the recursion clause, one stipulates that the class of objects is to be the smallest set that comprises all these basic objects, and all of their mereological sums or fusions. These are then taken to be all the objects there are or can be. The base sortals specify how to identify and individuate the mereological ur-elements, and mereological theory then tells us how to identify and individuate their sums. This procedure provides a clear and definite sense to the term 'object'—we might call them "mereological objects" on that base—turning it into (replacing it with) a genuine individuating sortal with criteria of identity as well as criteria of application. It then becomes possible for the first time to be entitled to talk about possible worlds as though they were relational structures of the model-theoretic sort. For now it makes sense to think of them as having *domains*: the set of all objects in that world.

So far, so good. The argument that leads from the KS-thesis about modality, through Leibniz's Law, to a modal identity absolutism that denies the truth of any strongly cross-sortal identities entails that *whatever* the mereological base is (so long as it is a proper subset of the sortals in play in natural language), almost *no* identities between mereological objects and ordinary objects will turn out to be true. The domains of possible worlds construed according to this mereological strategy will not include *any* of the ordinary or scientific kinds of things we

think of our world as comprising. Persons are not mereological sums of subatomic particles, nor are cats, coins, rocks, trees, clouds, molecules, genes, viruses, cells, most kinds of artifacts…. For all these kinds of things have criteria of identity that are radically different from those of mereological sums of particles. They are accordingly subjects of quite different subjunctive-dispositional properties. Mereological sums are not altered by disruptions of spatio-temporal contiguity: the sum is the same mereological sum no matter *where* its parts are. That is not true of *any* of the kinds on the list of ordinary thing-kinds I offered above. Again, all of those ordinary and scientific kinds of things would retain their identity upon *some* substitutions of parts for similar parts. I would not be a different person had I had only one radish in last night's salad, instead of two. Corresponding claims hold for all kinds of living things, and for artifacts. Perhaps we should not say that something would have been the same molecule if one of its electrons had been swapped for a different one, but things of almost every kind that are made of molecules would survive substitution of one of its molecules for another of the same kind. Mereological sums do not.

One might think of fundamental ontology as a discipline that is constitutionally committed to biting bullets of this sort. One decides on a privileged vocabulary (for instance, a set of base sortals and the mereological apparatus for elaborating them), Ramsifies theories in any further target vocabulary, and looks for the "closest realizers" specifiable in that privileged vocabulary of the functional roles that result from the Ramsification. The modal identity absolutism that we have seen is a consequence of the modal Kant-Sellars thesis need have no quarrel with such a procedure. Its strictures extend only to forbidding confusing the relation between such realizers and the things falling under the target sortals that got Ramsified with

identity. (The case is analogous to that of material constitution, the clay being a kind of realizer of the statue.) Ontological reduction to a privileged vocabulary construed in terms of identities relating items governed by sortals of the base and target vocabularies will almost always be strongly cross-sortal, hence ruled out by modal identity absolutism. I discussed this issue more fully in Chapter One.

The modal Kant-Sellars thesis reveals a pragmatically mediated semantic dependence of predicates Quine taught us to think of as *extensional* on predicates he taught us to think of as *intensional*. For the claim is that *all* extensional empirical predicates have subjunctive-dispositional, hence intensional, consequences, which accordingly provide necessary conditions for the applicability of the extensional predicates. The underlying pragmatic dependence is that an essential aspect of *grasping, understanding*, or mastering the *use* of OED vocabulary is grasping, understanding, or mastering subjunctive and counterfactual reasoning in which that vocabulary occurs. To know what cats or copper are requires knowing at least something about how they *would* behave under various circumstances: what follows from being a cat or made of copper, when that claim is conjoined with various auxiliary hypotheses, independently of whether one takes those auxiliary hypotheses to be true.

This much is not news to proponents of intensional semantics. What is grasped or understood when one knows how to use a predicate must include at least its intension. ("At least" because the fact that *intentional* predicates *do* fail the indiscernibility of identicals shows that there is *more* to what is cognitively *grasped* in deploying vocabulary than just the

intension.) But taking seriously the pragmatically mediated semantic dependencies between vocabularies asserted by the modal KS thesis does oblige us to distinguish between two concepts of extensional predicate that the tradition for which Quine speaks runs together. The first is the idea that a sentential context, a (possibly complex) predicate P is extensional just in case all that matters to its applicability is the identity of the object to which it is applied, regardless of *how* it is referred to. It is the requirement that:

EXT1) *P* is extensional$_1$ iff if *Pt* and *t*=*t*', then *Pt'*.

This is just the condition that *P* falls within the scope of the indiscernibility of identicals. The other idea of extensionality is that predicates are extensional if their applicability depends only on what is true at a single index, paradigmatically a possible world, and not at all on what happens at other values of that index. So, the thought is, we only need to look at *this* world to tell whether something is a cat or has a mass of 5 kilograms, but we need to look at other possible worlds to tell whether it is fragile or water-soluble.

EXT2) *P* is extensional$_2$ iff whether *Pt* is true at world *w* depends only on the facts at *w*. Differences in the facts at any other world *w'* are irrelevant to whether *Pt* is true at *w*.

This is the sense of 'extensional' that matters for the contrast with *intensional* predicates, whose applicability at any given index can depend on the whole *function* from indices to extensions.

Although Quine would not have countenanced the way I have articulated the second sense, he clearly thought that (EXT1) and (EXT2) amount to the same condition—that they are at least extensionally equivalent (in the sense of EXT1). For his reason for rejecting appeal to predicates that are *not* extensional$_2$ is that they are not extensional$_1$. He takes extensionality$_1$

("referential transparency") to be the hallmark of comprehensibility.[48] The good thought that Leibniz's Law provides our best grip on the notion of identity is a good reason for such an attitude. We can see, however, that in the context of the modal Kant-Sellars thesis, subjunctive-dispositional vocabulary is extensional$_1$ without being for that reason extensional$_2$. The modal KS thesis shows that the idea, at the core of Quine's thought, of a purely extensional$_2$ language that is autonomous—that is, that could be a language-game one played though one played no other—is an ultimately incoherent fantasy. It does not follow that the idea of an autonomous language that is extensional$_1$ is incoherent. Nor does the modal KS thesis in principle threaten the semantic strategy of defining intensions in terms of extensions, as functions from indices to extensions. One must just deploy this fundamental conceptual machinery of intensional semantics in the context of a full appreciation of the *pragmatic* dependence of the use of vocabulary that is extensional$_1$ on what is made explicit by the use of vocabulary that is *not* extensional$_2$.

One might, of course, consider these radical conclusions as a *reductio ad absurdam* of the line of argument that leads to them—so arguing by *modus tollens* rather than *modus ponens*. As far as I can see, to do so requires rejecting the modal Kant-Sellars thesis. That is the principal piece I have added to the puzzle about sortals and identity as classically conceived, to yield the modal identity absolutism that in turn commits one to the potentially objectionably radical conclusions. But I take the KS-thesis to codify a deep insight about how what is made explicit

[48] "I find extensionality necessary, indeed, though not sufficient, for my full understanding of a theory." W.V.O. Quine, *From Stimulus to Science*, [Harvard University Press, 1995], p. 90.

by alethic modal vocabulary is implicit in and fundamental to the use of any autonomous vocabulary whatsoever. Offering any empirical description, attributing any empirical property, involves commitments as to what *would* happen to what is so described under various circumstances: what would be true of it *if* various other claims *were* true. What distinguishes description from mere labeling is precisely that *circumstances* of appropriate application are paired with *consequences* of such application. Thus describing something places it in a space of implications, which inferentially articulate the content of the description. And those inferences always include subjunctive ones: inferences that involve collateral premises or auxiliary hypotheses not drawn exclusively from one's current commitments. One who understood *none* of the subjunctive implications one was committing oneself to by applying the terms 'mass' or 'cat' could not count as grasping the concepts they express. If that is right, though, one cannot consistently restrict the properties with respect to which identicals must be indiscernible to properties that are "nonmodal" in the sense of being modally insulated: their possession has no consequences for how things are in possible worlds other than the one in which they are exhibited. For there are no such properties. Perhaps we could introduce predicates stipulated to behave like this—and in that way, quite unlike those of our actual languages-in-use. Even so, there could be no autonomous language—one that could be used though no other was—whose use consisted *only* in applying predicates expressing such properties.

END

Three Essays on the Metaphysics of Objects and Properties

Chapter Three

Sellars's Metalinguistic Expressivist Nominalism

I. Introduction

The five years from 1958 through 1962 were extraordinarily productive ones for Wilfrid Sellars. His monumental "Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and the Causal Modalities," appearing in 1958, was a suitable follow-up to "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (which had been delivered as three lectures at the University of London in 1956).[49] Sellars never further developed the expressivist approach to alethic modality that he sketched in that paper, apparently having taken the ideas there as far as he could.[50] In that same year, he delivered two lectures at Yale, under the title "Grammar and Existence: A Preface to Ontology," (*GE*, 1958) which announced an expressivist, nominalist project in ontology that he then pursued in two other equally remarkable and original essays: "Naming and Saying" (*NS*, 1962) and "Abstract

[49] *CDCM* appeared in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume II: Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem*, ed. Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p.225-308. *EPM* is reprinted in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, Robert B. Brandom (ed.) [Harvard University Press, 1997].

[50] I assess how far he got, and speculate about the difficulties that could have prevented further progress, in "Modal Expressivism and Modal Realism, Together Again," (henceforth *MEMRTA*) forthcoming.

Entities" (*AE*, 1963).[51] Jumblese, dot-quotes, and distributive singular terms, the conceptual tools he developed and deployed in those essays to respond to the challenges to his approach to universals he had identified in *GE*, were to remain at the center of Sellars's philosophical enterprise for the rest of his life. Taken as a whole, these three essays provide an unusually detailed picture of the philosophical process through which Sellars progressed from an initial characterization of problems whose solutions he could not see clearly to the introduction of novel conceptual machinery that solved those problems to his durable satisfaction.

Sellars's point of departure is a view Carnap had put forward in *The Logical Syntax of Language*: to say that triangularity is a property is a way of saying in the material mode (the object language) what is said more perspicuously in the formal mode (in a certain kind of metalanguage) as "'triangular' is a monadic predicate."[52] This is the idea he is committed to making work in the three essays on nominalism. What Sellars calls "classifying contexts" are uses of ontological-categorial vocabulary, paradigmatically common nouns for ontological categories such as 'property' and 'kind' (and their genus, 'universal'), the property and kind names that fall under such common nouns ('triangularity', 'lionhood'), and the higher-order relations those properties and kinds are taken to stand in to their instances (such as 'exemplification' in "Anything that is triangular exemplifies triangularity."). The Carnapian idea is that vocabulary of these sorts is covertly *metalinguistic*. Its use appears to tell us something about the world: what kinds (ontological categories) of things are in it. There are not only

[51] All three essays are reprinted in *In the Space of Reasons: Selected Essays of Wilfrid Sellars*, Kevin *Scharp and Robert Brandom (eds.) [Harvard University Press, 2007].

[52] Like Sellars, I will use "triangular" as short for "…is triangular", where confusion is not likely to result.

particulars, but also their properties and kinds, related to those particulars by the distinctive relation of exemplification. But actually, the claim is, the information conveyed by the use of such ontological vocabulary concerns the syntactic form of language or thought, and is not about the world talked or thought about. "Lionhood is a kind," really means "'Lion' is a common noun (sortal expression)."

Such a metalinguistic species of nominalism about universals would have obvious attractions to those already of a nominalistic bent (perhaps due to a taste for desert landscapes). Is there any reason that those not already hagridden by nominalistic commitments should take it seriously? One potentially powerful argument is that anyone who knows how to use predicates such as "…is triangular" or common nouns such as "lion" already knows how to do everything they need to know how to do to use abstract terms such as 'triangular' and 'lionhood', and categorizing vocabulary such as 'property' and 'kind'. Sellars says:

> [T]o know how to use singular terms ending in '-ity' is to know that they are formed from adjectives; while to know how to use the common noun 'quality' is (roughly) to know that its well-formed singular sentences are of the form '— is a quality' where the blank is appropriately filled by an abstract noun. (That the parallel points about '-keit' and 'Qualität' in German are genuine parallels is clear.) Thus, while my ability to use 'triangular' understandingly involves an ability to use sentences of the form '— is triangular' in reporting and describing matters of physical, extralinguistic fact, my ability to use 'triangularity' understandingly involves no new dimension of the reporting and describing of extralinguistic fact—no scrutiny of abstract entities—but constitutes, rather, my grasp of the adjectival role of 'triangular'.[53]

'Triangularity' and 'lionhood' are singular terms formed by nominalizing adjectives and sortal common nouns, and 'property', 'quality', and 'kind' are categorizing sortals under which those

[53] *GE* Section XIV.

nominalized adjectives and common nouns fall. Of course this consideration is not immediately decisive, since we can imagine a Bergmannian language in which one first learned to respond to triangular things by applying "…exemplifies triangularity," and only later, on that basis, learned to use "…is triangular." Nonetheless, it seems clear that one must begin by using expressions that are equivalent to predicates (adjectives): ground-level classifications. Even in the Bergmannian context, higher-order ontological classifiers such as 'property' will still be sortals that apply to nominalizations of these.

In *GE*, Sellars identifies two major objections that any metalinguistic nominalism about properties and kinds (universals) of this shape must face. The first is that ontologically categorizing statements such as "Triangularity is a property," do not mention linguistic expressions, while their proposed paraphrases, such as "'Triangular' is a monadic predicate," do. This difference becomes clear when we think about translating both the ontologically categorizing sentence and its explicitly syntactic paraphrase into another language. "'Triangular' ist ein Prädikat," and "'Dreieckig' ist ein Prädikat," are not equivalent. Which one is supposed to be the correct paraphrase of "Dreieckigkeit ist eine Eigenschaft," which translates "Triangularity is a property"? The difference between the material mode statement and its supposed paraphrase into the formal mode is even more striking when we consider counterfactuals involving them. Presumably, "Triangularity is a property" would still have been true even if the English language had never developed. Not so "'Triangular' is a predicate."[54] If the claim that "'Triangularity' is a property," is "covertly metalinguistic" or "quasi-syntactic" in

[54] Cf. Sellars's Section XIV of *GE*.

character is to be sustainable in the face of these facts, the qualifications "covertly" and "quasi-" will have to be explicated in a way that avoids these consequences.[55]

The second objection Sellars considers is, in effect, that metalinguistic nominalism would be at best a half-hearted nominalism. For it does not avoid ontological commitment to properties (or universals, more generally). Rather, it eliminates nonlinguistic properties and kinds for linguistic ones. In place of *triangularity* and *lionhood* we get *predicatehood*, and *sortalhood*, the kinds to which belong everything that has the property of *being a predicate* or *being a sortal*. It seems that metalinguistic nominalism cannot do without expression-kinds and properties of linguistic expressions. Unlike the previous objection, this one does not directly address the adequacy of a metalinguistic account of the expressive role of ontological classifying vocabulary. It just points out that such an account is only *locally* deflationary about property-talk and kind-talk, remaning committed to it as regards *linguistic* properties and kinds.

In the large, the project Sellars announces in "Grammar and Existence", motivates in "Naming and Saying," and completes in "Abstract Entities" is to refine Carnap's deflationary, expressivist idea that ontological category vocabulary is fundamentally metalinguistic, by developing it in a way that is immune to these two fundamental objections. In what follows, I describe how he does that, and critically assess the result. In brief, his response to the first objection is to introduce the technical apparatus of dot quotation, formed according to what

[55] "Quasi-syntactic" is the technical term Carnap uses in *The Logical Syntax of Language* for material mode expressions that should be given metalinguistic analyses.

Sellars calls the "illustrating sign-design principle." His response to the second is to introduce further technical apparatus: the notion of distributive singular terms. This linguistic device plays a central role in drawing a distinction between what could be called "two grades of nominalistic involvement." Sellars distinguishes a broader notion of repeatability from a notion of universality, under the slogan "the problem of 'the one and the many' is broader than the problem of universals."[56] He designs his metalinguistic nominalism so that the linguistic repeatables that replace worldly universals in his theory are not universals in the narrow sense.

The main critical claim I want to defend is in three parts. First, Sellars's subtle and sophisticated development of Carnap's metalinguistic nominalism in fact gives us a good account of the expressive role characteristic of the vocabulary of ontological categories, in particular of terms such as 'triangularity', 'lionhood', 'property', and 'kind'. Second, though, I want to claim that he misunderstands the significance of this penetrating analysis. What he offers is best understood as an account of what speakers are *doing* when they say things like "'Triangularity' is a property," namely, classifying expressions that play the same conceptual role as the English "…is triangular" and the German "…ist dreieckig" as adjectives. The nominalistic conclusion he wants to support, however, concerns not what one is *doing* in saying "'Triangularity' is a property," but what one is *saying* by doing that. His analysis is properly understood as conducted in a *pragmatic* metavocabulary, but the conclusions he draws must be formulated in a *semantic* metavocabulary. Lacking the concept of a pragmatic metavocabulary,

[56] *AE* p. 166.

Sellars is not in a position to separate these considerations. Sellars's analysis is *compatible* with semantic nominalism about universals, but does not provide an *argument* for it.

Third, I discuss the largely independent motivation for nominalism about universals that Sellars offers in "Naming and Saying." This is epitomized in his introduction of a third bit of original technical apparatus: the language Jumblese. This argument, too, turns on the transition from a fundamental pragmatic observation about the *use* of language—that *predicating* is a kind of doing that is in principle only intelligible in terms of *saying* (asserting) and *naming* (referring), which are accordingly more conceptually basic kinds of discursive doing—to controversial claims about semantics and ontology. Its essential reliance on inferences of these forms, from what one is *doing* to what one is *saying* by doing that, shows Sellars's *metalinguistic* semantic and ontological *nominalism* to be a particular kind of *pragmatist expressivism*.

II. Dot Quotes and the Objection from Language Relativity

The divergent behavior of "Triangularity is a property," and "'…is triangular' is an adjective," under translation and in various counterfactual circumstances shows that ontologically categorizing vocabulary such as 'property' and property-terms such as 'triangularity' are not metalinguistic in the narrow sense (Tarski's) of being common nouns and singular terms falling under them that refer to the expressions of a particular object-language, such as English. This does not mean that they could not be understood to be metalinguistic in a broader sense. To specify such a sense, Sellars introduces the idea of a special kind of quotation:

dot-quotation. Generically, like other forms of quotation, it is a mechanism for forming expressions from expressions. It does not, however, form *names* of expressions. Indeed, it does not form singular terms at all. I have the impression that many readers of Sellars think of dot-quoted expressions as being names of functional or conceptual roles: that •triangular• names the conceptual role played by 'triangular' in English.[57] This is not right, and in the context of Sellars's version of nominalism about properties, it is absolutely essential to see why it is not right.

The principal features of expressions formed using dot-quotes are:

1. All expressions formed by dot-quoting other expressions are common nouns (sortals), not singular terms. That is why their basic use is in conjunction with indefinite articles as in "'dreieckig' is a •triangular•," (compare: "Rex is a dog,") or, equivalently "'dreieckig's are •triangular•s" (compare: "Terriers are dogs").
2. The items falling under this kind of common noun are expression-types.
3. All the items falling under a particular common noun formed by dot-quoting an expression stand to the type of that expression in the equivalence relation …plays the same functional-conceptual role as___.

So if *e* and *e′*are specifications of expression-types, *e′* is a •*e*• just in case *e′*plays the same conceptual role in *its* language that *e* plays in its language. Because …plays the same functional-conceptual role as___ is an equivalence relation, one *could* treat it as an abstractor, and appeal to

[57] I blush to confess that I have spoken and even written carelessly in this way myself—but even Sellars himself is not always as careful on this point as he teaches us to be in *AE*.

it to define an abstract singular term that *does* refer to the conceptual role shared by all the expression-types that stand in that relation to one another. (Perhaps one thinks of it as a name of the equivalence class defined by that relation—though that construal is certainly not obligatory.) But that is not what dot-quotes do. They would not be of much help to a program of working out a deflationary nominalist analysis of abstract entities such as properties if they did. They do serve a broadly *classificatory* function, producing a common noun that applies to all the expressions that share a conceptual role. But they do not do so by abstraction. This distinction, and the possibility it enforces of classifying without abstracting, is central to Sellars's response to the second objection to metalinguistic nominalism.

Sellars is rather casual about the equivalence relation other expression-types must stand in to the type of the illustrating expression in order to fall under the common noun that results from dot-quoting it. He talks indifferently about "playing the same role," "serving the same function," "performing the same office," and "doing the same job." He is happy to call it a "functional" role, or a "conceptual" role. He says that what is at issue is the *prescriptive* relations it stands in to other expressions, not the descriptive ones, so he is clearly thinking about roles articulated in *normative* terms. He explicates this point by analogy to the role played by the pawn in chess. In a footnote, he indicates that he thinks these roles can be specified in terms of (norms governing) the language-entry, language-language, and language-exit transitions of a language.[58] I think Sellars's lack of specificity here should be seen as evidence that the relation …(in English) functions similarly to ___(in German) should be seen as a placeholder, or

[58] Pp. 176-179. The footnote in question is #13.

parameter. Filling in the respects of similarity in some definite way gives rise to a correspondingly definite specification of the meaning of a particular dot-quoting locution. Dot-quoting is intended to be a *kind* of quotation, comprising as many species as there are respects of similarity of function. The elasticity of the notion of prescriptive features of conceptual or functional role should be regarded as a feature of the account, not an oversight in it.

The expression-token that appears between dot-quotes specifies the class of role-equivalent expression-types that fall under the sortal formed by the dot-quotes by *illustrating* it. The class in question is all the expression-types that are role-equivalent to the type of the quoted token. This is the "illustrating sign-design principle." This is a kind of use of the quoted expression that is more than a mere mention of it. For, unlike standard quotation, which does merely mention the quoted expression, one cannot *understand* something of the form •*e*• unless one understands the quoted expression *e*. For unless one grasps the conceptual role *e* plays in its home language, one does not know how to tell what other expression-types stand to it in the …plays the same functional-conceptual role as___ relation, and so does not know what expression-types fall under the sortal •*e*•.

Expressions formed using dot-quotes are metalinguistic in a straightforward sense. They are common nouns that apply to expression-types. Sellars's idea for developing Carnap's metalinguistic analysis of what appear on the surface to be names of properties or universals, like 'triangularity' and 'lionhood', is to analyze them semantically in terms of this sort of common noun. Ontologically classifying contexts, such as "Triangularity is a property," and "Lionhood is

a kind," he analyzes as "•…is triangular•s are adjectives," and "•lion•s are common nouns." *This* kind of metalinguistic statement is not subject to the first objection to Carnap's simpler version. Though they are statements in English (extended by adding some technical apparatus), they do not *refer* specifically to expressions of any particular language. Unlike ordinary quotation, but like "Triangularity is a property," and "Lionhood is a kind," they can be translated into other languages. The illustrating expressions, from which the dot-quotes are formed, can be translated right along with the rest of the sentences in which they are used. And just as it is true that even if there had never been English speakers, triangularity would still have been a property, it is true that even if there had never been English speakers, •…is triangular•s would still have been adjectives." (To deal with counterfactuals regarding the absence of language altogether, we must allow the expression-types that fall under common nouns formed by dot-quotation to include virtual ones, that is, expression-types in merely possible languages.) I conclude that the apparatus of dot-quotation permits Sellars to formulate a successor-theory to Carnap's that retains the motivating strategy of metalinguistic analysis, while successfully immunizing itself against the first objection.

III. Two Kinds of Repeatables, Two Grades of Abstract Involvement

Addressing the second principal objection to the claim that abstract entity talk is metalinguistic, requires more than the crafting of a sophisticated extended sense of

'metalinguistic' (epitomized by the technical notion of dot-quotation), however.[59] It requires thinking hard about the nature and motivation of nominalistic commitments concerning abstract entities. For understanding triangularity in terms of •triangular•s—as in the formulation "To say that triangularity is a property is to say that •triangular•s are monadic predicates,"—is understanding the candidate abstract entity triangularity in terms of the linguistic expression-*type* •triangular•. And expression-types are themselves repeatables, under which various possible expression tokenings (in different actual and possible languages) can fall. So it would seem that being a •triangular• is a property that expressions (for instance, "dreieckig" in German) can have. In that case, nonlinguistic abstract entities, such as the property of triangularity (which triangular things have), are being analyzed in terms of linguistic abstract entities, such as the property of being a •triangular•. That suggests that metalinguistic nominalism about abstract entities is only a half-hearted nominalism, rejecting, it seems, only nonlinguistic abstract entities, but embracing linguistic ones. Such a view would in turn raise the question of the motivation for such a metalinguistic form of nominalism. Why should it be seen as a responsive answer to the considerations that motivate nominalistic commitments in the first place? Indeed, it obliges us to ask the question: What do nominalists want? What are the rules of their game?

It cannot be that nominalism consists in insisting that all we do is refer to particulars using singular terms. Nominalists must allow that we also *say* things. Doing that is more than merely referring to things. Even in the simplest case, it is saying something *about* the particulars we

[59] Sellars is happy to put his claim more baldly: "[A]bstract entities which are the subject of contemporary debate between platonist and anti-platonist philosophers—qualities, relations, classes, proposition,and the like—are linguistic entities." [*AE* I, p. 163]. In the next section, I'll give reasons why we should resist this formulation.

refer to. It is classifying those particulars somehow. Classification involves some kind of repeatability on the part of the classifiers. Leo and Leona are both lions, and they are both tawny. Leo and Leona are classified together in that one can correctly say "…is a lion" and "…is tawny" of the two of them. Sellars thinks of explaining what we are saying when we say that as a modern version of the classical "problem of the one and the many." The beginning of wisdom in the area, for Sellars, is to distinguish that problem from the problem of universals: the problem of saying what properties are. His analysis

> requires us to hold that not all *ones* over and against *manys* are universals (i.e. qualities, relations, sorts, kinds, or classes), and consequently to conclude that the problem of "the one and the many" is in fact broader than the problem of universals...[60]

That is, Sellars will distinguish a narrower class of abstract entities, what he calls "universals", from a broader class. He offers a deflationary metalinguistic nominalist analysis only of the narrower class. I will call this the strategy of distinguishing two grades of involvement in abstraction.

Following Carnap, Sellars is an ontological nominalist because he is a semantic nominalist. (And I will argue further along that that semantic deflationism is rooted in conceptual dependencies at the level of pragmatics—that is, in deep features of the *use* of the expressions addressed.) Here is a crude initial statement of the line of thought. Nominalism, as its name suggests, begins with views about *names*—or more broadly, singular terms. What there is can be named. (That is the connection between ontology and semantics, for nominalists of the sort under discussion.) What appear to be property-names or kind-names are not genuine names.

[60] *AE* I, p. 166.

So there are no such things. Sellars takes it, though, that common nouns, sortal expressions, are part of the apparatus of naming. For singular terms require criteria of identity and individuation that are supplied by covering sortals. The sortals also supply basic criteria and consequences of application for those singular terms (distinguishing them from mere labels).[61] Those sortals are, accordingly, a kind of "one in many" with respect to the objects that are referents of singular terms they govern. By contrast to the narrower class of universals, this, Sellars thinks, is a kind of one in many that the nominalist cannot and should not do without. He says:

> [T]o refer to such a *one* we need a singular term other than the singular terms by which we refer to individual pawns, and yet which does not refer to a universal of which they are instances.[62]

If sense can be made of this kind of unity in diversity, then the way is open to understanding linguistic expression-types on this model, rather than on the model of universals and their instances or exemplifications. Doing so provides a way of responding to the second large objection to metalinguistic nominalism.

For a paradigm of a "one against a many" that is *not* a universal, not an abstract entity in the narrower, objectionable sense, he offers *distributive singular terms* (DSTs), such as "the lion" or "the pawn". We can use them to say such things as "The lion is tawny," and "The pawn cannot move backwards." These can be understood as paraphrases of "Lions are tawny," and "Pawns cannot move backwards." These latter are things one understands as part of

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[61] Sellars discusses this distinction in *CDCM*:
…although describing and explaining (predicting, retrodicting, understanding) are *distinguishable*, they are also, in an important sense, *inseparable*. It is only because the expressions in terms of which we describe objects… locate these objects in a space of implications, that they describe at all, rather than merely label. [§108]
I talk about it in Chapter Eight of *Reason in Philosophy* [Harvard University Press, 2009].

[62] *AE* I, p. 166.

understanding how to use the common nouns, which is already part of understanding the use of singular terms such as ‘Leo’. Here is the strategy:

> If, therefore, we can understand the relation of *the lion* (one) to *lions* (many) without construing *the lion* as a universal of which lions are instances; and if the looked-for singular term pertaining to pawns can be construed by analogy with “the lion”—indeed, as “the pawn”—then we would be in a position to understand how *the pawn* could be a one as against a many, without being a universal of which pawns are instances. This in turn would enable a distinction between a generic sense of “abstract entity” in which the lion and the pawn as well as triangularity (construed as the •triangular•) and that two plus two equals four (construed as the •two plus two equals four•) would be abstract entities as being ones over and against manys and a narrower sense of abstract entity in which qualities, relations, sorts, classes, propositions and the like are abstract entities, but of these only a proper subset, universals but not propositions, for example, would be *ones* as over and against *instances* or *members.* This subset would include the kind *lion* and the class of pawns, which must not be confused with *the lion* and *the pawn* as construed above.[63]

The contrast between two levels of involvement in abstraction is then the contrast between two sorts of nominalizations of common nouns such as “lion”, “pawn”, and •triangular•. Nominalizing common nouns (deriving singular terms from them) in the form of DSTs such as “the lion” is perspicuous and nominalistically unobjectionable, while nominalizing them to form kind-terms, such as “lionhood” is not. I want to propose that one lesson that can be drawn from Sellars’s is that we can understand nominalism in terms of differential attitudes towards different kinds of nominalization. But we will have to work our way up to this point.

[63] *AE* I, p. 167.

The capacity to use distributive singular terms can be algorithmically elaborated from the capacity to use the common nouns they are derived from, via the schema

$$\text{The K is F} \equiv \text{Ks are F.}$$

The right-hand side of this equivalence is not a conventional quantification. In the case of natural kind-terms, like "lion", it is something like essential properties that matter. The claim about Ks can be thought of as modified by something like Aristotle's "generally, or for the most part" operator. (The existence of a non-tawny lion would not falsify "The lion is tawny.")[64] The case we really care about, DSTs formed from common nouns formed by dot-quoting expressions, has special features, however. Sellars introduces them by analogy to "the pawn", rather than "the lion." The features that determine the truth of statements of the form F(the pawn) ("The pawn cannot castle,"), he says, are *prescriptive* rather than *descriptive* features of pawns. He means that it is the normative features that define the role something must play in a game to be a pawn—what features of its behavior are obligatory or permissible for pawns—that determine the truth-value of statements in which the DST occurs essentially. Besides those properties, each pawn will have matter-of-factual properties, such as being carved of wood, or being less than one inch tall, which are contingent features of some realizers, some items that play the role of pawn. Those do not support statements using the DST "the pawn." In this respect, "the pawn" is like "the •triangular•". It is norms governing the use of •triangular•s that determine what is true of the DST, too—even though "the pawn", unlike "the •triangular•" is not metalinguistic.

[64] What I say here should be understood as only a crude gesture at a complex and important topic. For a more nuanced discussion, see Part One of Michael Thompson's pathbreaking *Life and Action* [Harvard University Press, 2008].

The equivalence schema shows that DSTs are just a special way of referring to Ks: to lions or to pawns. Not to one single K, but to all of them, distributively. That the reference is distributive means that it is not to the *group* of Ks, but, as it were, to Ks *as* Ks.[65] We can contrast this special mode of distributive reference with another bit of technical machinery that has been used by another kind of nominalist (Goodmanian nominalists) to do some of the same work Sellars wants DSTs to do: mereology. Mereological sums, too, are "ones in many." And they are different from universals. The part-whole relation they stand in to their mereological parts is not that of kind or property to *instance*. The difference is that mereological sums are a special kind of thing, over and above their parts. Singular terms referring to such sums are not special ways of referring to the parts, as DSTs are for particulars to which the common nouns from which they are formed apply. In this respect, mereological nominalism is *less nominalistic* than Sellarsian metalinguistic nominalism. For DSTs are not construed as singular terms referring to a different kind of entity from ordinary particulars. The mode of reference is different, specifically, distributive. But what is referred to is just what common nouns apply to. And that is the same particulars that singular terms refer to. There is no appeal to things of other ontological categories besides particulars. By contrast, mereological sums are formed from their parts by abstraction, as sets are. The difference between mereological sums and sets lies in the

[65] Sellars says remarkably little about just how he thinks plural statements such as "Lions are tawny," in terms of which statements formed using DSTs, such as "The lion is tawny," are to be understood. He might have only a slippery grip on the point that what is true of "the mayfly" can be quite different from what is true of most mayflies. Michael Thompson offers a sophisticated discussion of this point in *Life and Action* [Harvard University Press, 2008]. Ruth Millikan's notion of Proper Function underwrites quite a different analysis of the same phenomenon.

equivalence relation that is the abstractor, not in their abstractness.[66] Sellarsian nominalism must regard mereological sums, no less than sets, as ultimately metalinguistic in character.

The case Sellars really cares about, of course, is where the common nouns from which DSTs are formed are themselves the result of dot-quoting expressions of some type. An instance of the DST equivalence is:

The •triangular• is a predicate ≡ •triangular•s are predicates.

And, given Sellars's analysis of property-names, we can extend this to:

The •triangular• is a predicate ≡

•triangular•s are predicates ≡

triangularity is a property.

Unlike "the lion" and "the pawn", "the •triangular•" is a *metalinguistic* DST. It refers, distributively, to expression-types (in a variety of actual and possible languages). That is why this Sellarsian analysis is, like Carnap's less sophisticated account, a *metalinguistic* nominalism about what is expressed by property-names as a subset of ontological category vocabulary. Triangularity-talk is understood to be a misleading (because not explicitly metalinguistic) way of talking about the •triangular•, that is, •triangular•s, that is, expression-types that stand to "triangular" in some suitable (not for these purposes fully specified) relation of functional

[66] Cf. the discussion in Chapter Six.

equivalence.[67] The equivalence relation is not, however, being appealed to as an abstractor that yields a singular term referring to an abstract object (perhaps identified with the equivalence class) that stands to the things it is abstracted from in a relation of exemplification. This is the difference between talking about the lion, or just lions—which is a way of referring to lions—as opposed to lionhood.

That is the difference between two kinds of ones-in-many, which is the basis of Sellars's response to the objection that metalinguistic nominalism about properties and kinds must just trade nonlinguistic universals for linguistic ones. The strategy of distinguishing two grades of involvement in abstraction does trade nonlinguistic universals (lionhood, triangularity) for linguistic ones-in-many (the •lion•, the •triangular•), but not for linguistic *universals*. The explanatory progress being made corresponds to crossing the line between two sorts of unity in diversity. Universals (properties, kinds) are eschewed entirely.

IV. Nominalism and Nominalization, Functions and Objects

[67] I have suppressed niceties concerning Sellars's distinction, in *AE*, between "triangular" and ★triangular★ (the first being a quote-name of a word type, the second a quote-name of a sign-design type. Expressions formed by dot-quoting are officially common nouns applying to the latter, not the former.

I said above that a metalinguistic nominalism that relies so heavily on this distinction between different kinds of repeatables—abstract entities in a strict or narrow sense where singular terms and covering common nouns are introduced by abstraction using equivalence relations on their instances, and divided (distributive) modes of reference to particulars—raises questions about the motivation for nominalism of this sort. Nominalism can be thought of as a hygienic recommendation regarding the conditions under which it is appropriate to introduce names—or, more generally, singular terms. More particularly, I think it is useful to think of nominalism as a policy concerning *nominalization*: the introduction of new singular terms (and common nouns or sortal expressions governing them) by grammatically transforming other expressions.

Sellars is concerned to distinguish two ways of nominalizing common nouns. "Lion" can be nominalized by abstraction, to form the property-name "lionhood." Or it can be nominalized by forming the distributive singular term "the lion," which we can understand in terms of the *plural* "lions." The basic claim of this sort of nominalism is that nominalizations of the former sort are unperspicuous and misleading, requiring metalinguistic analysis in terms of operators that form common nouns applying to expression-types by dot-quoting expressions illustrating those types, and operators that form DSTs from those dot-quoted expressions. (Abstractive nominalizations are "quasi-syntactic," that is, material mode versions of statements perspicuously framed in the formal mode, as Carnap describes them in *The Logical Syntax of Language*. Sellars's corresponding term is "covertly metalinguistic.") Nominalizations of the latter sort are all right as they stand. Adjectives such as "…is triangular" and "…is red" take only nominalizations of the misleading abstractive sort: "triangularity" and "redness."

Nominalism is a set of scruples about nominalization—a division of nominalization strategies into acceptable and unacceptable, or at least perspicuous and unperspicuous.

Although my focus here has been on predicate-nominalizations and properties, Sellars also thinks that declarative sentences have only nominalizations of the narrow sort, which purport to name abstract entities in the form of propositions. He proposes that these be analyzed metalinguistically, by equivalences of the form:

"That snow is white is a proposition." ≡

"The •Snow is white• is a sentence." ≡

"•Snow is white•s are sentences."

So an extensional characterization of the split between nominalizations that unperspicuously invoke abstracta in the narrow sense (which are to be analyzed metalinguistically, using dot-quotes and DSTs), and nominalizations that invoke ones-in-many that are not covertly metalinguistic is this: kind-terms (sortals, common nouns) can go either way, depending on what sort of nominalization is at issue. Predicates (adjectives) and declarative sentences only take nominalizations that seem to refer to abstract entities in the narrow sense, and are to be understood by deflationary metalinguistic paraphrases. The only categories of expression-types that admit of nominalizations that are not to be construed as covertly metalinguistic are singular terms themselves (which are, as it were, their own nominalizations) and common nouns.[68] What

[68] For a possible qualification, see the remarks about gerunds (present participles) at the end of Section VI.

is the motivation for this way of distinguishing the two grades of involvement in unperspicuous abstraction?

I said above that for the metalinguistic nominalist, the reason common nouns take nominalizations that are not covertly metalinguistic (such as “the lion” and “lions”), is that they are already involved in the mechanism of singular reference to particulars—that is, broadly speaking, in naming. They also take unperspicuous, covertly metalinguistic nominalizations, purporting to name abstract entities in the narrow, objectionable, sense, (such as “lionhood”) because besides incorporating criteria of identity and individuation (permitting plurals and so distributive reference) they are like predicates in incorporating criteria and consequences of application. This means common nouns come with associated predicate-adjectives (“…is a lion”), which admit nominalizations purportedly naming abstract entities in the narrow sense the metalinguistic nominalist is concerned to deflate. But the reason common nouns also take nonmetalinguistic nominalizations must be that they can be construed as mechanisms of reference to particulars, albeit in the distinctive mode of plural, divided, or distributive reference, not just that there can be no singular term reference in the absence of individuating sortals. For it is equally true that there can be no singular term reference (“naming”) in the absence of assertion of declarative sentences (“saying”) or (therefore) predicating. Yet nominalizations of expression-types of those grammatical categories admit only ontologically unperspicuous nominalizations.

At the end of "Abstract Entities" Sellars offers a further characterization of the difference between abstract entities in the narrow sense, invoked by unperspicuous nominalizations to be nominalistically paraphrased metalinguistically, and in the wider sense. It corresponds, he says, to the distinction between abstract entities which are not *objects*, but *functions*.[69] He explicitly mentions Frege in this connection (while denying that there is anything paradoxical about reference to functions). Kind-terms (which have both criteria of application and criteria of individuation and identity) admit both readings, while predicate adjectives (which have only criteria of application) initially support only the functional reading. (They do admit of nominalizations that refer to objects, as we see below, but these are doubly unperspicuous and covertly doubly metalinguistic.)

> The possibility that the word "kind" might have these two senses throws light on Russell's erstwhile distinction between classes as ones and classes as manys. Or, with an eye to Frege, we can say that in contexts such as ["The •the lion• is a DST," which reduces to "•the lion•s are DSTs"] kinds are *distributive objects*, whereas in ["The •lion• is a common noun," which in turn reduces to "•lion•s are common nouns" (Sellars's paraphrase of "Lionhood is a kind,")]-like contexts they are concepts or functions.[70]

Again, he offers as examples:

> Triangularity is a quality and not a (distributive) individual (i.e., The ·triangular· is a predicate and not a DST).
> *Triangularity* is a (distributive) individual and not a quality (i.e., The ·the ·triangular·· is a DST and not a predicate).[71]

Triangularity as a quality is a paradigm of a *function*, while *triangularity* as a distributive individual is a corresponding object. (Sellars marks the difference by using italics in the latter case.[72]) This sort of derivative nominalization corresponds to meta-metalinguistic DSTs.

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[69] *AE* VII, pp. 188-189.
[70] *AE* V, p. 186.
[71] *AE* VII, p. 189.
[72] *AE* IV, p. 183-184.

While it is not immediately clear what Sellars means by saying that some of these nominalizations refer to functions rather than objects (and the invocation of Frege's views from "Concept and Object" and "Function and Concept"[73] threatens to explain *obscurum per obscurius*), it does seem that he is lining up abstract entities in the *narrow* sense with *functions*. Nominalizations that invoke functions are the unperspicuous ones (cf. "classes as ones"), by contrast to nominalizations that invoke objects, albeit distributively (cf. "classes as manys").

V. Saying, Naming, and Predicating

I think Sellars explains his reasons for drawing where he does the line between nominalizations of the two kinds—straightforward and covertly metalinguistic—and for the appeal to a distinction between objects and functions, in the third of the trio of essays I have been considering, "Naming and Saying." The proximal topic of this essay is the contrast between two different approaches to universals: that of Gustav Bergmann (of the Vienna Circle) and one Sellars associates with Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.[74] Of particular interest is that accounts of both

[73] In Peter Geach and Max Black (trans.) *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* [Blackwell, 1966], originally published in 1952.

[74] There are many fine things in this essay that I shall not discuss. Two subtleties worthy of at least passing mention are: i) Sellars's sensitive and judicious treatment of vexed interpretive question of exactly what stand the *Tractatus* takes on the intelligibility of multiple distinct *monadic* facts (since facts are "arrangements" of objects); and ii) the distinction between color and shape predicates in this context: "green" has both adjectival and

sorts end by appealing to something *ineffable*—though the ineffability arises at characteristically different places in the two. Though himself coming down firmly on the Tractarian side of the dispute, as he understands it, Sellars diagnoses the objectionable ineffability as having a common aetiology in the two cases—as being rooted in the same failure of understanding.

In its crudest terms, the Bergmann-*Tractatus* debate is about how many ontological categories of things there are in the world, and how we should understand their relations. For Bergmann, there are two kinds of things, particulars and universals, and just one relation, *exemplification* of a universal by particulars, that they can stand in.[75] Saying that two particulars stand in some relation, for instance that Ludwig is subtler than Gustav, is producing names of the two kinds (names of particulars and names of a universal) in a way that conventionally conveys that they stand in the relation of exemplification. The disappointing addendum is that that relation is ineffable. Naming (nominalizing) it, for instance, 'exemplification', is at best of heuristic and not analytic value, since the relation between it and the particulars and universal it relates (e.g. Ludwig, Gustav, and the relation of being subtler than) would itself have to be understood as…exemplification. And then we are off to the races on a Bradleyan regress.

By contrast, according to the Tractarian view Sellars considers, there is only one kind of thing in the world: particulars. They stand in a variety of relations. Saying that two particulars

substantival uses, which invites confusion (it can serve as its own adjective-nominalization—"Green is a color"—though it also takes "greenness"), whereas "triangular" nominalizes *only* as "triangularity".

[75] Sellars: "[F]or Bergmann there is…only *one* relation, i.e. exemplification, and what are ordinarily said to be relations, for example *below*, would occur in the world as *relata*." [*NS* 109]

stand in some relation, for instance that Ludwig is subtler than Gustav, is arranging names of the particulars in a way that conventionally conveys the fact that the particulars stand in that relation. The disappointing addendum is that the relation (picturing) between statement (the fact that the names are arranged as they are in the saying) and the fact (that the particulars stand in the relation) is ineffable. It is not itself a fact that can be stated, as a relation obtaining between a names-fact and a particulars-fact, but only something that can be shown. Here what threatens is not so much a regress as circularity: the explicit statement of the semantic picturing relation between statements and facts could be understood only by someone who already implicitly grasps the relation between statements and facts, and so could not substitute for or ground such a grasp.

Here is Sellars's summary:

> To keep matters straight, it will be useful to introduce the term 'nexus' in such a way that to say of something that it is a nexus is to say that it is perspicuously represented in discourse by a configuration of expressions rather than by a separate expression. If we do this, we can contrast Bergmann and Wittgenstein as follows:
>
> > *Wittgenstein*: There are many nexus in the world. Simple relations of matter of fact are *nexus*. All objects or individuals which form a nexus are particulars, i.e. individuals of type 0. There is no relation or nexus of exemplification in the world.
> > *Bergmann*: There is only one nexus, exemplification. Every atomic state of affairs contains at least one…individual which is not a particular.
>
> If one so uses the term 'ineffable' that to eff something is to signify it by using a name, then Wittgenstein's view would be that what are ordinarily called relations are ineffable, for they are all nexus and are expressed (whether perspicuously or not) by configurations of names. For Bergmann, on the other hand, what are ordinarily called relations are effed; it is exemplification which is ineffable.[76]

[76] [*NS* 109].

Notice that Sellars here expresses the nominalism being opposed to Bergmannian ontological profligacy as a restriction on what can strictly be *named* (hence how nominalizations are to be understood: where straightforwardly and where in terms of metalinguistic paraphrase). An assumption taken to be common to all concerned is that what can be named and what is "in the world" coincide, and that anything else is strictly "ineffable". One might rather tie ineffability to what cannot be *said* (explicitly) but at most only shown or otherwise conveyed (implicitly). I'll return to this question.

Sellars sensibly takes the invocation of something ineffable as a symptom of analytic and explanatory failure. His diagnosis (repeated with emphasis in the concluding sections of both *NS* and *AE*) is that the surplus beyond what is named when we say something, what shows up on these mistaken accounts as ineffable, is not a *thing* but a *doing*.

> Thus the "relation" of exemplification which for Platonists binds the realm of becoming to the realm of being, and which for more moderate realists binds the "real" order to the "logical" or "conceptual" order, is an offshoot of the "relation" of truth, which analysis shows to be no relation at all, but a sign of something to be **done**. [*AE* 203]

The supposedly ineffable alternatives, exemplification (Bergmannian platonism) and the relation between statements and facts (Tractarian nominalism) are both manifestations of what is invoked by truth-talk. And that, Sellars thinks, is best understood not in terms of a word-world relation but in terms of the propriety of a metalinguistic *inference*.

> What, then, does it mean to say
> That green a is a fact
> Clearly this is equivalent to saying
> That green a is true
> …

> This, however, is not the most perspicuous way to represent matters, for while the equivalence obtains, indeed necessarily obtains, its truth depends on the principle of inference—and this is the crux—
> From 'that green a is true' (in our language) to infer 'green a' (in our language).
> And it is by virtue of the fact that we *draw* such inferences that meaning and truth talk gets its connection with the world. In this sense, the connection is *done* rather than *talked about*.
> Viewed from this perspective, Wittgenstein's later conception of a language as a form of life is already foreshadowed by the ineffability thesis of the *Tractatus*.
> But to see this is to see that no ineffability is involved. For while to infer is neither to refer to that which can be referred to, nor to assert that which can be asserted, this does not mean that it is to fail to eff something which is, therefore, ineffable." [*NS* 125]

A number of moves are being made here. First, the "two ineffables", exemplification and the relation between statements and facts, are both being traced back to what is expressed by statements using 'true'. "a *exemplifies* green" is a way of *stating* the *fact* that a is green. (Stating is the paradigmatic kind of saying.) Second, "A fact is a thought that is true" (Frege, in *The Thought*).[77] (Keep in mind the "notorious 'ing'/'ed' ambiguity here: he does *not* mean 'thought' in the sense of a thinking, an act, but in the sense of what is thought—or better, thinkable—a content.) Third, talk about truth is (as Frege also recognized), misleading talk about what one is *doing* in saying something in the sense of making a statement: the use of 'true' is to be understood in terms of the platitude that asserting is taking-true. Fourth, the way 'true' expresses what one is doing in asserting is also expressed in the propriety of the disquotational *inferences* codified in Tarskian T-sentences.

[77] "The crucial ineffability in the *Tractatus* concerns the relation between statements and facts. Is there such a relation? And is it ineffable? The answer seems to me to be the following. There is a meaning relation between statements and *facts*, but both terms are in the linguistic order." [*NS* 124]

All of these moves are contentious. I am not concerned to defend them here. I am concerned to understand the original motivation and general rationale for connecting nominalizations the Sellarsian nominalist wants to treat as not referring to *things*, such as "triangularity", with discursive *doings*. For this, I want to suggest, is what becomes of the otherwise puzzling distinction, evidently intended to be coextensional, which we worried about at the end of the previous section, between referring to *objects* and invoking *functions*. As we might break things down, in the first step, functions are what articulate functional roles. In the second step, functions, as Sellars is thinking of them, are things only in the sense of things *done*: doables. Nominalization of functions is what Sellars's nominalism invites us to forbid in perspicuous languages, and to give a deflationary treatment of the functioning of, in unperspicuous ones.

I think we can begin to understand the idea behind this line of thought if we look at the activities of that give "Naming and Saying" its title, and how the relations between them are thought to be made more perspicuous by the third technical innovation (besides dot-quotes and DSTs) that Sellars uses to articulate his nominalism. This construction, introduced in that essay, is the language-form he calls "Jumblese."[78] We can sum up the line of thought in *NS* that I have been considering in the slogan: Appeal to an ineffable semantic relation is a sign that one is trying to do in one's *semantic* theory what can only be done in the *pragmatic* theory, the theory of the *use* of the language. *Saying*, putting something forward *as* true, asserting—the central and

[78] The name comes from Edward Lear's nonsense poem "The Jumblies", Sellars tells us, because "Far and few, far and few, are the lands where the Jumblies live." (He does not mention that "Their heads are green, and their hands are blue…", though his topic is the significance of just such predications. Greenness and blueness are not mentioned on the inventory of things they took with them when they "went to sea in a Sieve.")

paradigmatic use of declarative sentences—is a *doing*, not a semantic relation. So is *naming*, in the sense of referring (using an already established term, rather than naming in the sense of introducing such a term). Referring is the central and paradigmatic use of singular terms.

If the first lesson Sellars wants us to learn is that the result of trying to explain what one is *doing* in *saying* something (a pragmatic matter), in terms of the semantic relation between a name and what is named, is an appeal to an ultimately magical, ineffable version of that relation, then the second, nominalist, lesson is that even within the realm of semantics, the name/named model cannot be used to understand the use of predicates or sentences. In particular, predication, in the sense of the act of predicating (classifying something nameable) is a *derivative* speech act. It does not belong at the same level of analysis as the more fundamental acts of saying and naming. Predicating something (universal) of something (particular) is just saying something *about* something. It is to be understood in terms of the relation between a kind of *doing*, asserting, which in the base case essentially involves the use of singular terms, and the semantic relation of referring, which holds between a name (singular term) and what is named (referred to).[79]

It is because the speech act of predicating is a derivative one that predicative expressions play a subordinate role to singular terms and sentences.

> [T]he classical problem of universals rests in large part on the fact that, in such languages as English and German expressions referring to universals are

[79] Though he does not say so, I expect that Sellars learned from Kant the lesson that one cannot, as the pre-Kantian tradition tried to do, understand *saying* in terms of *predicating*. I explain how I take Kant to have learned this lesson, and the central role it plays in his thought, in Chapter One of *Reason in Philosophy*.

> constructed on an illustrating principle which highlights **a design which actually plays a subordinate role**, and consequently tempts us to cut up such sentences as Triangular (*a*)
> into two parts, one of which has to do with the universal rather than the particular, the other with the particular rather than the universal, and tempts us, therefore, to construe the statement as asserting a dyadic relation ("exemplification") to obtain between the particular and the universal.[80]

Jumblese is designed to make *syntactically* vivid the derivative *pragmatic* role of predication, which in turn underlies the deflationary, nominalist metalinguistic *semantic* analysis Sellars is recommending for *nominalizations* of predicative expressions, such as "triangularity." Jumblese has no predicative expressions. Its sentences consist entirely of names (singular terms). The names specify what one is talking *about* (referring to). What one is *saying* about what one is talking about is expressed by *styles of arrangement* of those names. So, in one version the claim that Wilfrid is subtler than Gustav might be expressed by juxtaposing them and writing the first name in larger type than the second: Wilfrid Gustav. That Gustav was Austrian might be expressed by writing his name in a distinctive font: 𝔊𝔲𝔰𝔱𝔞𝔳. Jumblese, we might want to say, overtly marks only naming and saying: what one is referring to, by the singular terms used, and what one is asserting about it, by the style in which the terms are written (including the relations between the singular terms). Predication is only implicit in what one is doing in saying something about something.

A consequence of the absence of overt predicate-expressions is that there is nothing to nominalize into an analog of "triangularity." There is nothing to which to apply the "illustrating principle" that forms •triangular•s, which could tempt one to introduce the new common noun "property", enabling one to say "Triangularity is a property," that is, •triangular•s are predicates

[80] [*AE* 201].

(the •triangular• is an adjective). Of course, we *could* introduce nominalizations of predicate-adjectives even into (a dialect of) Jumblese, perhaps by using names of the styles the level-0 names are written in. Since it is the *fact that* "𝔊𝔲𝔰𝔱𝔞𝔳" is written in the Script-MT-Bold font that *says that* Gustav is Austrian, we could say that •…is Austrian•s are predicates (that is that being Austrian is a property) by saying that Script-MT-Bold is a predicate-indicating font—or, in a Jumblese metalanguage, by asserting "Script-MT-Bold" (where writing the font-name in the Berlin Sans FB font indicates that it is the nominalization of a predicate).[81] But while Jumblese *permits* such nominalizations, it does not *encourage* them. And it does not even *permit* the formation of those nominalizations according to an *illustrating* principle, which is what makes ontological-category talk such as "Triangularity is a property" *covertly* metalinguistic (Carnap's "quasi-syntactic"): a formal-mode statement masquerading in material mode. "Script-MT-Bold" is *overtly* metalinguistic, consisting, as it does, of a name of a style of writing, here, a font (itself, of course, written in a particular style).

VI. From Semantic to Pragmatic Metalanguages: Assessing Metalinguistic Nominalism

[81] In Section VIII of *AE*, Sellars considers how bound variables might work in Jumblese. (But do his readers care? The result of this expository choice is an *extremely* anticlimactic ending—one could not say conclusion—to the already long and technical essay.) Elsewhere in the same piece, he indulges himself in speculations about Jumblese metalanguages (*inter alia*, for Jumblese), and about the adventure that would consist in translating Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* into Jumblese. Oddly, he says nothing about the *spoken* version of Jumblese—the version in which, we are authoritatively informed, the Jumblies said "How wise we are! Though the sky be dark and the voyage be long…." One version of spoken Jumblese would be tonal: melodic. The effect would be reminiscent of Gregorian chants. A written Jumblese *pragmatic* metavocabulary for such spoken Jumblese would resemble musical notation (and *its* use, a Glasperlenspiel).

In the earliest of the three essays I have been discussing, Sellars identifies two major objections to Carnap's metalinguistic nominalism about ontological category vocabulary, principally predicate-nominalizations (such as "triangularity") and their associated common nouns (such as "property"). First, statements such as "Triangularity is a property," do not mention any linguistic expressions, and so are not metalinguistic in the classical sense. Unlike Carnap's proposed paraphrase, " 'Triangular' is a predicate," they would be true even if no-one had ever spoken English, and do not change their reference or become unintelligible to monolinguals if translated into German. Second, it seems such an approach just trades non-linguistic universals, such as "being triangular" for linguistic ones, such as "being a predicate." Sellars's response to the first objection is that it turns on too narrow and undifferentiated a conception of the metalinguistic. He offers a more capacious and nuanced one, reformulating Carnap's paraphrase using dot-quotation to form common nouns that functionally classify expression-types using the "illustrating sing-design principle." He responds to the second by conceding that classification under repeatables is not to be explained away, but insisting that we should distinguish the broader "problem of the one and the many" from the narrower "problem of universals." The formation of plurals from common nouns (including those formed by dot-quotation of illustrating expressions: "•triangular•s are predicate-adjectives") and their nominalization by forming distributive singular terms instead of kind-names ("the •triangular•" rather than "•triangular•ness"—in the non-metalinguistic case, "the lion" rather than "lionhood") allows the metalinguistic nominalist to endorse a version of Carnap's paraphrase without commitment to linguistic (or any) universals in the narrow, objectionable sense.

I think these responses are wholly successful in producing a development of Carnap's idea that is immune to the objections that prompted them. The second move, however, prompts the question of why we should resist reifying universals in the form of properties and kinds. Why should we insist on metalinguistic paraphrases of claims made using *these* nominalizations, and hence reject a straightforward referential semantics for these singular terms, which understands them as referring to abstract entities? Sellars's argument, as presented in "Naming and Saying," turns on the second-class ("derivative", "subordinate") character of *predicating* (and, more generally, classifying), relative to saying and naming. That is, the basis for metalinguistic nominalism about property and kind nominalizations in *semantics* is to be found in considerations proper to *pragmatics*: considerations concerning what we are *doing* when we use various expressions. I think we can and should resist this move.

Sketched with a very broad brush, I think the argument goes like this. Predicate-adjectives have a very different function and use than do singular terms. *Hence*, it is misleading to understand singular terms formed by nominalizing them as referring to a special kind of *thing*: abstract entities.[82] I don't think this is a good inference. It is true both that predicating is not naming, but must be understood in terms of the relations between naming and saying, and that one can only understand singular terms formed by nominalizing predicates in terms of the use of the underlying predicates. On this latter point, Sellars argues in effect that the capacity to use

[82] A corresponding argument goes through for common nouns, which are like predicate-adjectives in having classifying criteria of application, even though they are unlike predicate-adjectives in also having criteria of identity and individuation for the singular terms associated with them. Also, Sellars wants to adopt the same sort of metalinguistic paraphrase strategy for nominalizations of sentences ("that snow is white," together with the corresponding common nouns such as "proposition"). Again, the avowed motivation for this is that what one is *doing* in *saying* something is different from *referring* (though referring to particulars is in the base case included as one aspect of saying). Nonetheless, for simplicity, in this summary, I focus on the predicate-adjectives and their nominalizations.

ontological category talk—predicate- and kind-nominalizations, such as "triangularity" and "lionhood", and the common nouns that govern their identity and individuation, such as "property"[83] and "kind"—is *pragmatically dependent* on the capacity to use the underlying predicate-adjectives and common nouns. In the terms I use in *Between Saying and Doing*, this is a PP-necessity claim.[84] Unless one has the capacity to use the nominalized terms, one cannot count as having the capacity to use their nominalizations. Further, his version of the Carnap metalinguistic paraphrase strategy shows us how the capacity to use predicate-adjectives ("…is triangular") can be *algorithmically elaborated* into the capacity to use the nominalizations ("triangularity").[85] This is a special kind of PP-sufficiency claim. I agree with all this, and think that showing how to algorithmically elaborate the ability to use adjectives into the ability to use nominalized property-talk is a significant achievement. Further, I agree that the pragmatic dependence (PP-necessity) claim suffices to show that Bergmann is wrong to think of the nominalization-talk as *conceptually prior* to the use of the predicate-adjectives and ground-level common nouns. Bergmann is right that there is a *semantic* equivalence between saying that a exemplifies triangularity and saying that a is triangular. However, there is an underlying *pragmatic a*symmetry. One *could* learn how to use "…is triangular" (•triangular•s) first, and

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[83] And, though he doesn't say so, others such as "trope", understood as something like "unrepeatable instance of a property."

[84] Oxford University Press, 2008. Hereafter "*BSD*".

[85] Sellars suggests that the fact that some kind-terms mark *functions* rather than *objects* (discussed in Section IV above) means that thinking of them as naming universals is committing something like the naturalistic fallacy. In this respect, he seems to be putting abstract-entity-talk in a box with normative vocabulary. Normative vocabulary, like modal vocabulary, he takes to play the expressive role, not of describing something ("in the world in the narrow sense"), but of explicating the *framework* within which alone describing is possible. (I discuss this Kantian move in Chapter Five.) These vocabularies are what in *BSD* I call "universally LX": elaborated from and explicative of every autonomous vocabulary. I have just been claiming that the use of ontological-category vocabulary (such as "property" and "proposition"—the common nouns that govern singular terms purporting to pick out abstract objects such as universals like triangularity) can indeed be elaborated from the use of ordinary predicates and declarative sentences. One very important question that I do not address in this essay is whether (for Sellars, and in fact) such vocabulary is *also* explicative of essential features of the framework within which ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary functions, and if so, of *which* features.

only then, and elaborated solely on that basis, learn how to use "…exemplifies triangularity", and the property-talk that goes with it (as the common noun to this nominalization-by-abstraction). One could *not* learn it the other way around. In this sense, property-exemplification talk is not *pragmatically autonomous* from the use of predicate-adjectives, as Bergmann's priority claim commits him to its being. This sort of *pragmatically mediated conceptual dependence* is the same sort of priority claim that Sellars makes for "is"-talk over "seems"-talk, in *EPM*.[86] So far, so good.

More particularly, Sellars's claim is that what one is *doing* in saying that triangularity is a property is classifying •triangular•s as predicate-adjectives. That is a metalinguistic doing—of a distinctive kind, marked out by the use of the illustrating principle, to get a common noun, •triangular•, that applies to expression-types that stand to the displayed "triangular" in a parameterized functional-role equivalence relation. So it is fair to conclude that the *use* of ontological-categorial vocabulary involves a distinctive kind of metalinguistic expressive role. The question remains: what conclusions should one draw about the *semantics* of such expressions? Does playing that *pragmatic* metalinguistic expressive role *preclude* understanding the nominalizations ("triangularity", "lionhood"—or "being a lion") as *also* standing in referential ("naming") relations to *objects*? I do not see that it does. The fact that "good" essentially, and not just accidentally, has as part of its expressive role the possibility of being used to *commend* does not mean that it does not *also* describe in the sense of attributing a property. A corresponding point goes through for *modal* vocabulary.[87] From that fact that what

[86] See chapter One of *BSD*.
[87] As I argue in Chapter Five, "Modal Expressivism and Modal Realism, Together Again."

one is *doing* in *saying* that triangularity is a property is classifying •triangular•s as predicate-adjectives, it does not follow that that is what one is *saying*. It certainly does not follow that that is *all* one is saying. Sellars's analysis leaves *room* for denying that "triangularity" refers to a property. It provides an alternative. But he has not shown that these are *exclusive* alternatives, that we must *choose between* them. The singular terms formed by nominalizing parts of speech other than singular terms are, we might agree, distinguished by having a metalinguistic expressive function. But that is not yet to say that they do not *also* refer to a distinctive kind of object: property-universals (and propositions, including the true ones: facts).

Traditional Tarskian metalanguages—the kind we normally think about in connection with "metalinguistic" claims—are *semantic* metalanguages. They contain the expressive resources to talk about aspects of discursive *content*. Accordingly, they let us discuss truth conditions, reference relations, inferential relations, and the like. Carnap also deploys *syntactic* metalanguages, that let us talk about syntax, grammar, and lexical items (though Carnap himself uses "syntax" in an idiosyncratically wide sense in *The Logical Syntax of Language*). *Pragmatic* metalanguages have the expressive resources to talk about the *use* of language and the proprieties that govern it, for instance the activities of asserting, inferring, referring, predicating, and so on.[88] If I am right that the principle insight driving Sellars's metalinguistic nominalism is the idea that what one is *doing* in deploying concepts such as triangularity, lionhood, property, and kind is functionally classifying expressions using metalinguistic vocabulary of a distinctive kind (nominalizations formed according to the "illustrating sign-design principle"), that is an insight

[88] Pragmatic metavocabularies are one of the topics discussed at length in *BSD*.

properly expressible in a *pragmatic* metalanguage. The conclusion he wants to draw, however, concerns the *semantics* proper for that class of nominalizations and covering common nouns. The inferential relations between claims couched in pragmatic metalanguages and claims couched in semantic metalanguages are quite complex and little understood, however.[89] The inference Sellars is committed to here would go through only in the context of one or another set of auxiliary hypotheses, many of which would be implausible, or at least controversial, none of which does he discuss.

Sellars makes this slide unaware (to be sure, in the good company of expressivists addressing other sorts of vocabulary) because he doesn't have available the distinction between semantic and pragmatic metalanguages. According to that diagnosis, his argument is vulnerable because it relies on too crude and expressively impoverished a concept of the metalinguistic. This is an ironic situation, because I am accusing Sellars of making a mistake (or suffering from a disability) of a piece with the ones he discerns in the opponents he discusses in these essays. As we have seen, the first principal objection to Carnap's metaphysical nominalism that Sellars addresses he diagnoses as the result of appealing to insufficiently nuanced concepts of being metalinguistic. He responds by giving us more nuanced ones, which evade the objection. I am claiming that his notion of the metalinguistic is still too crude. Again, he diagnoses Bergmann and the *Tractatus* as running together *pragmatic* issues, of what one is *doing* in saying something or *predicating* something, with *semantic* issues. In particular, he claims that attempting to understand what one is *doing* in predicating or claiming by forcing it into the form of a semantic

[89] *BSD* introduces the topic, and provides a wealth of examples of the sort of complex relations between meaning and use that can be discerned once we start to think systematically about their relations.

relation inevitably results in commitments to the ineffability of that relation. This is the same genus as the mistake I am claiming he is making: running together *pragmatic* issues, of what one is *doing* in saying something, with *semantic* issues of what is *said* thereby.

This line of thought suggests that there are a number of different strands of broadly nominalistic thought in play. One genus is what might be called "nominalization nominalisms." These views make an invidious distinction between two classes of singular terms. *Genuine* singular terms are *referential*. They are to be understood semantically in terms of reference relations (the "name-bearer" relation), and successfully using them is referring to a referent. Genuine singular terms in this sense can fail to refer, but they, as we might say, *perspicuously purport* to refer to particulars. They are not *grammatically* precluded from being used to refer, and in any case are to be semantically assessed in terms of reference relations (or the lack thereof). By contrast (almost all) singular terms formed by nominalizing other parts of speech are grammatically misleading. These merely *ostensible* singular terms only grammatically, but *unperspicuously purport* to refer to particulars. On Sellars's development of Carnap's view, they are to be given *metalinguistic* readings. All singular terms have criteria of identity and individuation lodged in associated common nouns or sortals, which accordingly can also be divided into genuine and ostensible. This division generally corresponds to that between nouns that are not, and those that are, formed by nominalizing other parts of speech. The exception is that *some* nominalizations of common nouns or sortal expressions are sometimes counted as genuine (for instance, by Sellars and Kotarbiński).[90]

[90] It seems, for the same reason: otherwise the nominalization nominalist about the "problem of universals" has difficulty addressing the "problem of the one and the many." Kotarbiński, T., *Gnosiology. The Scientific Approach*

In these terms, I want to distinguish semantic and pragmatic species of the genus of nominalization nominalisms. The first kind of nominalization nominalism addresses the semantic *content* of the two classes comprising genuine and merely ostensible singular terms (the latter consisting of transcategorial nominalizations). Only genuine singular terms are to be understood in terms of their referential relations to particulars. The latter kind of nominalization nominalism addresses the pragmatic *use* of the two classes of terms and associated common nouns. The pragmatic nominalization nominalist understands the *use* of transcategorial nominalizations in metalinguistic terms of classifying linguistic expression-types. By contrast, the use of genuine singular terms is to be understood exclusively as *referring*, which is one essential feature of *saying* anything *about* particulars. I have claimed that the step from pragmatic to semantic nominalization nominalism is not straightforward. For one might distinguish transcategorial nominalizations from other singular terms by seeing their use as involving metalinguistic classification without thereby concluding that they do not *also* stand in referential relations to a distinctive kind of abstract entity. They just have this *extra* expressive function that *ordinary* singular terms do not have. Perhaps there is an illuminating and important relation between playing that distinctive expressive role and picking out the kind of object they do.[91]

to the Theory of Knowledge, trans. by O. Wojtasiewicz. [Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966]. This is a translation of Kotarbiński's *Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk*, Lwow: Ossolineum, 1929. Kotarbiński distinguishes between "genuine" and "non-genuine" names, and between semantic and ontological nominalisms.

[91] I have in mind determining the equivalence relation that is the abstractor.

In any case, when we discover that some kind of linguistic expression plays a distinctive expressive role (one not played by paradigmatically referring singular terms, for instance), we would seem methodologically to have two choices. We can think about that new expressive role in an *exclusionary* or in a *permissive* way. The exclusionary reading claims that the expressive role that has been discovered must exhaust what is available to determine semantic content. The contrasting permissive reading allows that playing that expressive role might be compatible with also playing other expressive roles (for instance, referring), and so not ruling out the corresponding semantics still being applicable. The fact that expressivists who want to adopt the exclusionary reading should argue for adopting this stance rather than the permissive one (as should those who want to adopt the less common permissive stance), of course, is not limited to the case of expressive nominalists.

What I have called "nominalization nominalisms" concern the use and content of linguistic expressions. Nominalism is usually thought of as an *ontological* thesis, however. Sellars endorses such a view:

> It is also argued that exemplification is a 'quasi-semantical' relation, and that it (and universals) are "in the world" only in that broad sense in which the 'world' includes linguistic norms and roles viewed (thus in translating) from the standpoint of a fellow participant.[92]

I take it that being "in the world in the narrow sense" means being in the *nondiscursive* world: the world as it was before there discursive beings, or a counterfactual world in which there never were discursive beings. If this is indeed the narrow sense of "in the world" that contrasts with the broad sense invoked in this passage, then it seems to me that there is a tension between this

[92] [*NS* 103].

claim and the response to one version of the first objection to naïve Carnapian metalinguistic expressivism about transcategorial nominalizations. This objection is that it cannot be right to understand sentences such as "Triangularity is a property," metalinguistically, because they would still have been true even if there had never been discursive beings. Sellars's response commits him to the claim that "•triangular•s are predicates" would still have been true even if there never had been discursive beings. Perhaps there are ways to vindicate this claim without being committed to •triangular•s being "in the world" in the narrow sense, but it is hard to see how. I suppose that he thinks that •triangular•s *are* "in the world in the narrow sense," but that that is compatible with his claim, since •triangular•s are not universals and are not exemplified by the expression-types they classify. (They are "ones in many", but not universals.) The presumptive presence of •triangular•s "in the world in the narrow sense" suggests that some work will need to be done to clarify and entitle oneself to appeal to this "narrow sense."

Be that as it may, what is "in the world in the narrow sense" is being taken to exclude universals because they are not, as we first might have thought, referred to by *genuine* singular terms, but only by *ostensible* ones. Nominalism in the ontological sense is the thesis that the world ("in the narrow sense") consists exclusively of *nameables*: things that could be referred to by *genuine* singular terms. This connection between *semantic* nominalism, which distinguishes genuine from merely ostensible ^{s}names^{s} (singular terms), and *ontological* nominalism, which restricts the real to what is nameable by genuine ones, is explicit in Kotarbiński. It seems to be Sellars's picture as well.

Now I am not at all sure that ontological nominalism in this sense is in the end so much as intelligible. In Sellars's version of semantic nominalization nominalism, among the transcategorial nominalizations that are analyzed metalinguistically, and which accordingly show up as not genuine singular terms, are *sentence* nominalizations, and their associated common nouns such as "proposition" and "fact". ("That snow is white is a proposition," is analyzed as "•Snow is white•s are declarative sentences.") Although "Naming and Saying" defends a Tractarian view against Bergmann on *some* important points, Sellars parts company with the *Tractatus* in taking a reistic position according to which the world (narrowly conceived) is *not* everything that is the case, a world of facts, but is rather a world exclusively of particulars, nameables not stateables. As far as I can see, Sellars is envisaging a world in which the "ones-in-many" needed to make sense of an *articulated* world are such as could be referred to by common nouns (sortals). That is the alternative to universals he seems to be working with. But to avoid commitment to universals, it seems that the criteria of identity and individuation associated with the (already, as it were, nominalized) common nouns must either do *all* the work, or must somehow immunize the criteria (and consequences) of application from supporting or making intelligible the contribution of the universals that threaten when predicate adjectives, which *only* have circumstances (and consequences) of application, but not criteria of identity and individuation, are nominalized. I don't pretend to know that this strategy cannot be made to work. But I also don't see that Sellars has given us many of the tools that would need to be deployed to make it work. Perhaps more fundamentally, I don't see that we have the makings of a story on the ontological or the semantic side of what corresponds on the pragmatic side to *saying* (claiming, believing) something. If the world is a collection of particulars—of course, collections are not "in the world in the narrow sense" either—what is one doing in *saying that*

things are thus-and-so? How are we to understand *either* the "thus-and-so" *or* the "saying that"? I am buffaloed.

Here is a potentially more tractable puzzle. I have interpreted the semantic side of Sellars's nominalism as what I have called a "nominalization nominalism," which distinguishes two classes of singular terms, genuine and merely ostensible. The merely ostensible ones are to be read metalinguistically, in the broad, nuanced sense of "metalinguistic" that applies to DSTs formed from dot-quoted expressions using the "illustrating sign-design principle." More specifically, I have claimed that all transcategorial nominalizations count for Sellars as merely ostensible singular terms according to this classification, and so, according to the ontological side of his nominalism, do not correspond to anything "in the world in the narrow sense." One kind of transcategorial nominalization, starting with a non-nominal part of speech and forming singular terms from it, is gerunds or present participles, such as "doing", "making", "breaking", "swimming", and "heating". These constructions form common nouns and singular terms from verbs. If my account of how the motivation of "Naming and Saying" shapes the account of "Abstract Entities" is correct—if being a transcategorial nominalization is sufficient for not being a genuine singular term for Sellars—then all singular terms formed from verbs must be merely ostensible, and correspond to nothing in the world construed narrowly. Sellars never discusses this case. Would he offer a broadly metalinguistic account of these terms and common nouns? If so, how would it go? Does his nominalism allow that the world "in the narrow sense" can include particular swimmings and heatings? These seem like particular events, rather than universals. A particular swimming falls under the common noun "swimming" as a particular dog falls under the one-in-many "…is a dog," rather than by way of exemplification. And the

processes of Sellars's late ontology can be thought of just as extended events, and seem naturally to be picked out by gerunds and present participles. So it seems that either there is a tension in Sellars's nominalism on this point, or I have characterized his nominalization nominalism too broadly. But if that is so, how should we determine which nominalizations of verbs and adjectives are alright, forming genuine singular terms and common nouns, and which are not? The considerations of "Naming and Saying" do not seem to give us adequate guidance here.

I want to close with the observation that, putting aside the slide I have accused Sellars of making from pragmatic to semantic considerations (via an exclusionary expressivism), however well semantic nominalization nominalism *fits with* ontological nominalism, the semantic thesis is not in the right shape to provide an *argument* for the ontological one—as Sellars in effect claims that it is in the passage from *NS* I quoted above. Even if the semantic claim that transcategorial nominalizations are not genuine (referring) singular terms is accepted, that in no way entails that only what *can* be so referred to exists in the real world. Such an ontological stipulation is at most *compatible* with the semantic commitment. So I do not think that there is an argument from Sellars's metalinguistic pragmatic and semantic nominalization nominalism to his ontological nominalism.

Nor can I see that the scientific realism epitomized in Sellars's *scientia mensura* passage—"In the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not,"—yields an argument for reistic

ontological nominalism.[93] That is, it would not help to restrict what exists in "the world in a narrow sense" to what can be *described.* The descriptive language of science is just as much up for alternative interpretations, nominalistic and otherwise, as ordinary language. If all that is right, then we should see Sellars's commitment to a reistic ontological nominalism of the sort epitomized by Kotarbiński (before his pan-somatist turn) as rock-bottom, not derived from or supported by other commitments. His metalinguistic expressivism about transcategorial nominalizations should be understood as aimed at showing that one *need* not countenance universals and propositions to understand the use of the expressions that ostensibly refer to them.

I conclude that Sellars has introduced and deployed the metalinguistic machinery of dot-quotes, distributive singular terms, and Jumblese to offer a sophisticated account of a distinctive metalinguistic role that transcategorial nominalizations and their associated common nouns play. That account, though, operates primarily at the level of *pragmatics*: as part of a theory of the *use* of these expressions. He has *not* thereby put himself in a position to be entitled to draw nominalistic *semantic* or *ontological* conclusions from the identification of that distinctive expressive role. In the absence of a fuller analysis of this case, we should no more draw that conclusion from Sellars's expressivist analysis of the use of property-terms than we should from his expressivist account of the use of alethic modal vocabulary.

[93] *EPM* §41.

END